The main legal point established in the judgment is that the court cannot take cognizance of an offence beyond the prescribed period of limitation, as specified in Section 468 Cr.P.C.

JASJIT SINGH BEDI, J.

The prayer in the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is for quashing of FIR No.0617 dated 28.09.2016 (Annexure P-2) registered under Sections 6, 7A and 12 of the Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas Restriction of Unregulated Development Act, 1963 at Police Station Samalkha, District Panipat, the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. dated 26.04.2019 (Annexure P-3) under Sections 6, 7A and 12 of Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas Restriction of Unregulated Development Act, 1963 and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom qua the petitioners.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the instant FIR was registered on the basis of a letter dated 09.07.2012 bearing memo No.386/SCA-38/11 which was written by the District Town Planner, Panipat to the Superintendent of Police, Panipat wherein the Investigating Agency was informed that the petitioners had infringed the provisions of the Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas Restriction of Unregulated Development Act, 1963. It was stated in the letter that the offenders/petitioners had neither applied for CLU permission nor had they restored the land. Directions were sought for the registration of an FIR. The copy of the letter dated 09.07.2012 is attached as Annexure P-1 to the petition.

3. On the basis of the said letter, an FIR No.0617 dated 28.09.2016 (Annexure P-2) registered under Sections 6, 7A and 12 of Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas Restriction of Unregulated Development Act, 1963 at Police Station Samalkha, District Panipat came to be registered against the petitioners. The copy of the FIR is attached as Annexure P-2 to the petition.

4. Pursuant to the registration of the FIR, the chargesheet/final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was presented against the petitioners before the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Panipat on 26.04.2019.The copy of the said report is attached as Annexure P-3 to the petition.

5. Subsequent thereto, the sanction under the Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas Restriction of Unregulated Development Act, 1963 was obtained from the District Magistrate, Panipat on 07.06.2019. The copy of the sanction is attached as Annexure P-4 to the petition.

6. The challan (Annexure P-3), the sanction order (Annexure P-4) and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are under challenge in this petition.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that as the maximum sentence prescribed was 03 years under Section 12 of Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas Restriction of Unregulated Development Act, 1963, the cognizance could have been taken by the Court within a period of 03 years from the date of knowledge of the offence as envisaged under Sections 468 and 469 Cr.P.C. In the instant case, the complainant-Department was aware of the fact that an offence had been committed on 09.07.2012 on which date a letter dated 09.07.2012 (Annexure P-1) had been sent to the Superintendent of Police, Panipat for the registration of an FIR. However, the FIR came to be registered only on 28.09.2016 and the final report was presented only on 26.04.2019. Therefore, the Court could not have taken cognizance of the offence in question. He thus contends that the FIR, the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are liable to be quashed. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Harneet Kaur Versus State of Haryana & another, CRM-M-45483-2017.

8. On the other hand, the learned State counsel while referring to the reply dated 18.04.2023 by way of an affidavit of Om Parkash, HPS, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Samalkha (Panipat), contends that a perusal of the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. would clearly establish the commission of the offence in question. Therefore, the FIR and the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. were not liable to be quashed. He, however, concedes that there is no specific denial to the argument of the petitioners that the very co