The court ruled that claims of discrimination in land acquisition compensation must be supported by substantial evidence, and that statutory remedies must be exhausted before seeking judicial relief.

JUDGMENT

Harkesh Manuja, J.

By way of present writ petitions, challenge has been laid to an Award dated 08.10.2021 (Annexure P-9) passed by respondent No.3 in pursuance to the acquisition proceedings carried out for the benefit of respondent No.2, vide notifications dated 15.01.2021, issued under section 3A of the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and notification dated 23.04.2021 issued under Section 3D, followed by an award dated 08.10.2021 passed in exercise of powers under Section 3G(5) thereof. As factual and legal points involved in both the cases are same, they are being taken up together. For convenience, facts are being taken from CWP No. 15956 of 2023.

2. In the present case, the land owned by the petitioner, situated within the revenue estate of Village Jhaneri, Tehsil Bhawanigarh, District Sangrur, came to be acquired in pursuance to the aforementioned notifications. Grievance of the petitioner in the present writ petition has been that vide Award dated 08.10.2021, pertaining to village Jhaneri, respondent No.3 assessed the market value of the land @ Rs.65,43,742/- per acre whereas, for the adjoining village i.e. Phagguwala, the market value was assessed @ Rs.91,59,257/- per acre vide Award dated 30.06.2021 by respondent No.3.

3. Impugning the same, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that both the villages being adjacent to each other, respondent No.3 failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested under Section 3G(5) read in consonance with Section 3G(7) of the Act in its proper perspective and rather in a discriminatory and arbitrary manner besides having failed to follow the dictate of Section 26(1)(B) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

4. On the other hand, Mr. Abhilaksh Gaind, Advocate, appearing on behalf of respondent No.2-NHAI having been supplied with advance copy of the writ petition submits that the present petition for the relief sought for was not maintainable as an alternate remedy under Section 3G(5) of the Act was available with the petitioner for invoking arbitration so as to assail the validity of the award passed by respondent No.3.

5. At this preliminary stage, I have heard learned counsels for the parties in details on the issue of maintainability of the writ petition in the wake of plea of alternate statutory remedy being available with the petitioner as pointed out by the learned counsel representing the respondents.

6. On the point of maintainability of present writ petition, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the alternate statutory remedy available in terms of Section 3G(5) of the Act is onerous, burdensome and ineffective for the reason that the Award passed by the Arbitrator, needs to be assailed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (for short 1996 Act), wherein, the Court does not have power to modify the same. In support, learned counsel relies upon a decision made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of "Project Director, National Highways No.45-E and 220 National Highways Authority of India v. M. Hakeem and Another", reported as AIR 2021 SC 3471. Relevant para of the same is reproduced hereunder:-

46. Quite obviously if one were to include the power to modify an award in Section 34, one would be crossing the Lakshman Rekha and doing what, according to the justice of a case, ought to be done. In interpreting a statutory provision, a Judge must put himself in the shoes of Parliament and then ask whether Parliament intended this result. Parliament very clearly intended that no power of modification of an award exists in section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. It is only for Parliament to amend the aforesaid provision in the light of the experience of the courts in the working of the Arbitration Act, and bring it in line with other legislations the world over.

6.1 Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that in terms of Sectio