The court upheld that delays in issuing awards under land acquisition laws can be excused due to litigation, providing that all statutory provisions have been substantially followed.

JUDGMENT

Sureshwar Thakur, J.

Through the instant petition, the petitioner(s) in the writ petition (supra) claim the hereinafter extracted reliefs.

(i) Quashing of the scheme framed by the respondent under Section 36 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 (hereinafter for short called as the 'Act of 1922'), in terms of resolution No. 29/360 dated 30.12.1994.

(ii) The award dated 09.02.1998 under the relevant statute be quashed and set aside, thus on the ground that it is made beyond the statutorily prescribed period of two years, since the issuance of the statutory declaration, under Section 42(1) of the 'Act of 1922').

Factual Background

2. That a notification under Section 36 of the 'Act of 1922' became initially published in the Indian Express on 17.01.1995, and, and whereafter it was published on 24.01.1995, and thereafter it was published for the third time on 31.01.1995.

3. Respondent No. 1 through exercising powers conferred under Section 41(1) of the 'Act of 1922' sanctioned the development scheme of area No. 1, Part 1, Pocket 'C', Pathankot. The said scheme was framed by Improvement Trust under Section 24 read with Section 28(2) of the 'Act of 1922'. The notification under Section 42(1) was issued on 16.01.1996.

4. After the issuances of notification(s) (supra), the award became passed on 09.02.1998, assessing thereins compensation amount(s), in respect of the construction(s) existing upon the acquired lands.

Contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners.

5. (i) The learned counsel for the petitioner(s) also contend that though in terms of Section 38(2) of the 'Act of 1922', thus after issuance of notice, the recipient of the said notice, can well avail an opportunity to file objections in writing, thus within a period of 60 days from the service of the aforesaid notice. However, she submits that there is breach done to the above statutory provisions, inasmuch as, no notice of the acquisition proceedings becoming served upon petitioners No. 2 to 5, and, it being served only upon petitioner No. 1. Therefore, the entire proceedings are argued to stand vitiated.

(ii) After the publication of the impugned scheme, petitioner No. 1 filed objection petition (Annexure P-5). However, the learned counsel for the petitioner(s) contends, that despite repeated requests, the petitioner no. 1 was not provided a copy of the layout plan of the impugned scheme rather for filing proper and better objections theretos. Thus, the mandate of Section 36(3) of the 'Act of 1922' was breached.

(iii) The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that, since the award (supra) was made after more than two years elapsing, since the issuance of notification under Section 42 (1) of the 'Act of 1922' on 16.01.1996, which corresponds to section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter for short called as the 'Act of 1894'), inasmuch as, the apposite award being pronounced on 09.02.1998, thereby breach is caused to the mandate enclosed in Section 11A of the 'Act of 1894', provisions whereof are extracted hereinafter, and resultantly the impugned award is vitiated, and, the same be quashed and set aside. In support of the above argument she relies upon a judgment passed by this Court in case titled as 'Suresh Chand and Others v. State of Haryana and Another, reported as 2004 (1) PLR 40 : 2003(2) PLJ 306 and upon a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, reported in AIR 1992 (SC) 2214.

(Provisions