JUDGMENT :

Jagmohan Bansal, J. (Oral)

1. The petitioner through instant petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is seeking direction to respondents to consider him from the date of joining of other candidates.

2. The petitioner retired from Indian Army on 30.11.2010. The Respondent-Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam advertised post of Assistant Lineman in 2011. He participated in the selection process. The result was declared on 04.10.2012 wherein name of petitioner did not figure. He approached this Court by way of Civil Writ Petition No. 137 of 2013. During the pendency of said petition, the respondent found him eligible for the post. He was issued appointment letter on 29.05.2013 and he joined on 02.07.2013. He retired on 31.03.2021. He claims that his date of appointment should be considered from October' 2012 instead of July' 2013.

3. The petitioner joined on 02.07.2013 without raising objection to the effect that his date of joining should be October'2012 like other employees who had joined pursuant to the same advertisement. He raised objection after his retirement in March' 2021 and respondents rejected his claim.

4. Civil Writ Petition No. 137 of 2013 was disposed of without direction to consider date of appointment of petitioner as October' 2012. He joined in July' 2013 and without demur worked till his retirement. He started raising his claim after retirement. Neither this Court while disposing of CWP No. 137 of 2013 directed the respondents to consider date of appointment as October' 2012 nor he raised any objection till his date of retirement. There is no plausible reason of inaction on the part of petitioner. By his act and conduct, he acquiesced action of the respondent.

5. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. Where illegality is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. State cannot deprive vested right because of a non-deliberate delay.

6. A two Judge Bench of Supreme Court recently in 'Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley and others' 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551 has held that High Court ought to dismiss petition on the ground of delay and laches where there is no explanation of delay. An applicant who approaches the Court belatedly or in the other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by writ Courts. Delay defeats equity. High Court may refuse to invoke its writ jurisdiction if laxity on the part of applicant has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. Multiple communications cannot create cause of action. The relevant extracts of the judgment are reproduced as below:

"9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the app