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2024 Supreme(P&H) 1609

PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT AT CHANDIGARH
SUDEEPTI SHARMA, J.
Dhanpat Singh - Appellant
Vs.
State Of Haryana And Others - Respondent 
RSA-640-2003 (O&M)
Decided On : 19-11-2024

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant :Mr. Ankur Sheoran, Advocate for Mr. Samrat Malik, Advocate
For the Respondent: Mr. Harish Nain, AAG, Haryana

JUDGMENT :

Sudeepti Sharma, J.

Challenge in the present appeal is to the judgment and decree dated 31.10.2002 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Rewari (hereinafter referred to as 'First Appellate Court'), whereby the appeal filed by the respondents against the judgment and decree dated 27.09.2001 passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Rewari (hereinafter referred to as 'trial Court'), was allowed and the said judgment and decree dated 27.09.2001 passed by learned trial Court was reversed.

2. The facts in brief are that date of birth in the matriculation certificate of the appellant/plaintiff was recorded as 15.05.1947, which was issued by the Punjab University, whereas as per the appellant/plaintiff, his date of birth is 15.08.1949.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the learned First Appellate Court has failed to appreciate the evidence on record and has set aside the well reasoned judgment of the learned trial Court. He therefore, prays that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and decreed dated 31.10.2002 passed by the learned First Appellate Court be set aside.

4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the learned First Appellate Court has rightly set aside the judgment and decree dated 27.09.2001 passed by the learned trial Court, vide its judgment and decree dated 31.10.2002. He relied upon the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh Vs. Megh Raj Garg and another, 2010(6) SCC 482 and The General Manager, M/s Barsua Iron Ore Mines Vs. The Vice President United Mines Mazdoor Union and Ors., 2024 AIR Supreme Court 2527. Therefore, he prays that the present appeal be dismissed.

5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the whole record of the case in hand.

6. A perusal of the record shows that the appellant/plaintiff did his matriculation in the year 1972 and joined service in the year 1975. He filed a civil suit for declaration for correction of his date of birth from 15.05.1947 to 15.08.1949. He moved the trial Court by filing civil suit on 05.10.2000 i.e. after a period of about 25 years. Meaning thereby, at the time of filing of the civil suit, appellant/plaintiff was about 53 years of age. Therefore, at the fag end of his service, he filed the civil suit to change his date of birth in his service record, which is not permissible, as per law laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court.

7. In Megh Raj Garg's case (supra), Hon'ble the Supreme Court held that being a law graduate, respondent-judicial officer must have been aware of the date of birth recorded in his matriculation certificate. He would have immediately after joining the service made an application to the university for change of his date of birth recorded in matriculation certificate. He waited for more than ten years after entering into service and submitted application to university for effecting change in the date of birth. It is further held that he applied for change of date of birth recorded in his service book much beyond the time limit of two years specified in the rule. Therefore, the Apex Court held that the High Court or the State Government did not have power, jurisdiction or authority to entertain such representation made by respondent after more than twelve years of entering into service.

8. In The General Manager, M/s Barsua Iron Ore Mines's case (supra), Hon'ble the Supreme Court held that respondent initially declared his date of birth on the basis of which, he got employment, cannot seek change of date of birth belatedly. Principles of estoppel would come into play.

9. In view of the above, I do not find any infirmity in the judgment and decree dated 31.10.2002 passed by learned First Appellate Court, whereby the judgment and decree dated 27.09.2001 passed by learned trial Court was set aside. Therefore, the present appeal is hereby dismissed and the judgment and decree dated 31.10.2002 passed by the learned First Appell

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