JUDGMENT :

Harpreet Singh Brar, J. (Oral)

1. The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Cr.P.C.') seeking quashing of impugned order dated 20.04.2023 (Annexure P-6) passed by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Sangrur in the case stemming from FIR No.80 dated 23.03.2023 under Sections 406 & 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short 'IPC'), registered at Police Station Bhawanigarh, District Sangrur, Punjab, vide which the petitioner was directed to produce the original passport before learned trial Court.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner, inter alia, contends that the petitioner along with co-accused was named in the FIR (supra). She was granted anticipatory bail and was regularly appearing before learned trial Court despite being an aged lady and suffering from various ailments. Yet, vide impugned order dated 20.04.2023 (Annexure P-6), the petitioner was directed to produce her original passport before learned trial Court, which is totally illegal and beyond the jurisdiction of learned trial Court. Learned counsel further argues that learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the fact that the power and jurisdiction to impound the passport of any individual has to be exercised as per the Passport Act, 1967 (for short 'the Act'), which grants this power only to the passport authorities. Since the Act is a special statute, the procedure prescribed by it will prevail over the provisions of Cr.P.C., since Cr.P.C. is general in nature. Reliance in this regard has been placed on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suresh Nanda Vs. C.B.I., 2008 (3) SCC 674 and of this High Court in Capt. Anila Bhatia Vs. State of Haryana, 2018 (4) RCR (Criminal) 899.

3. Per contra, learned State counsel, assisted by learned counsel for respondent No.2, opposes the prayer made by learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that there is every possibility that the petitioner would flee from the process of law and would abscond from the prosecution. Therefore, learned trial Court rightly directed the petitioner to produce her passport. However, he could not controvert the fact that the petitioner is not involved in any other case.

4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the record of the case with their able assistance, it transpires that the petitioner was arraigned as an accused in FIR (supra), which was lodged due to an ongoing matrimonial dispute between son of the petitioner and respondent No.2-his wife. The petitioner has already been granted the concession of anticipatory bail by this Court vide order dated 20.06.2022 passed in CRM-M-28865-2022 (Annexure P-3) and there is nothing on record, which would remotely suggest that the petitioner would flee from justice and would not join the proceedings. A review of the impugned order reveals that the petitioner was directed to produce the original passport before learned trial Court on the next date of hearing. The said direction is devoid of any reasoning or explanation in a rather mechanical manner.

5. A study of the Act shows that the power to impound a passport has been solely devolved to the passport authority under Section 10(3) of the Act. As far as Section 104 of Cr.P.C. is concerned, no doubt, the Court has been granted the power to impound any document or thing, however, it can only be exercised with respect to a document produced before it. Further, the Act is a special law, while the Cr.P.C. is a general statute. 'Generalia specialibus non derogant' is a settled principle of interpretation of statutes i.e. the special law prevails over the general law. Hence, a Court cannot take recourse to Section 104 of Cr.P.C. to impound a passport, although it can impound any other document or thing produced before it.

6. A two Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suresh Nanda's case (supra) made the following observations:

'15. In our opinion, even the Court cannot impound a passport