JUDGMENT :

Vikram Aggarwal, J.

Prayer in the present application preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is for condonation of delay of 2739 days in filing the appeal.

2. It has been averred in the application that the appellant was under the impression that the appeal had been filed on 09.02.2018 through an Advocate but on enquiry by the present counsel, through whom the present appeal has been filed, it was found that no appeal was registered or filed by the appellant after objections raised by the Registry. Thereafter, the said fact was brought to the knowledge of the earlier counsel, who informed the appellant that after objections having been raised by the Registry, the case file was misplaced and he could not file the appeal as the file was not traced out despite best efforts. A copy of the objections raised by the Registry in the appeal earlier filed by the appellant has been annexed as Annexure A-1. It has been averred that after arranging funds, the appellant engaged Mr. Dinesh Mahajan, Advocate and has filed the present appeal on 18.07.2025. It has been averred that under the circumstances, a delay of 2739 days in filing the appeal occurred.

3. I have heard learned counsel for the applicant-appellant.

4. Learned counsel for the applicant has strenuously urged that matter should be decided on merits and parties should not be non-suited on technicalities. Under the circumstances, learned counsel prays that the application for condonation of delay of 2739 days in filing the appeal deserves to be allowed.

5. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the applicant-appellant.

6. The appellant is the plaintiff, who had filed a suit for declaration to the effect that he was owner in possession of the estate of one Sh. Kirpal Singh of the land (fully described in the plaint) situated in Village Dalla Goria, Teshil and District Gurdaspur (hereinafter referred to as the 'disputed land'). Further, a declaration was also sought that the sale deeds dated 12.04.1994 and 15.11.2011, as also Will dated 27.01.1994 be declared to be illegal, null and void. Consequently, a relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing, interfering, alienating, mortgaging or creating any charge over the disputed land was also sought.

7. Parties led their respective evidence.

8. The trial Court dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 21.02.2015. The appeal filed by the appellant (plaintiff) was also dismissed by the first appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 25.10.2017, leading to filing of the present regular second appeal.

9. The present appeal along with the application for condonation of delay has been filed after a period of more than 7 ^1/2 years of the dismissal of the appeal by the first appellate Court.

10. Before adverting to the merits of the case, it would be essential to examine the law on the issue.

11. As per Section 5 of the Limitation Act, if sufficient cause is shown for not preferring an appeal or an application (other than an application under the provisions of Order XXI CPC) within the prescribed period, the same may be admitted after the prescribed period as well. It is by now well settled that the Courts have to adopt a liberal approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay. It is also well settled that normally, parties should be heard on merits and should not be non-suited on technicalities. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others (2013)12 SCC 649, the Hon'ble Apex Court culled out the principles with regard to condonation of delay:-

'From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

(ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be