JUDGMENT :

JASGURPREET SINGH PURI, J.

1. The present is a petition filed under Section 11 (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), seeking appointment of a sole arbitrator in the present case.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there exists a dealership agreement between the parties vide Annexure A-2, wherein there is an arbitration clause at Para No.22.12 which provides that all questions, differences, controversies or disputes whatsoever between the parties touching upon responsibilities and obligations of the parties or any matter connected with the terms of this agreement, whether as to constructions or otherwise, shall be referred to arbitration of a sole arbitrator as may be mutually agreed to be appointed as per the provisions of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. She further submitted that since a dispute arose between the parties, the petitioner served a notice dated 28.08.2025 upon the respondent vide Annexure A-7 for invoking the arbitration clause but no response was received from the respondent. Therefore, she submitted that this Hon’ble Court may appoint a sole arbitrator to adjudicate upon the dispute.

3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there is no dispute regarding the existence of the agreement (Annexure A-2) or the arbitration clause contained therein and there is also no dispute regarding the invocation of the arbitration clause by the petitioner by issuing notice (Annexure A-7) upon the respondent, to which the respondent did not reply. He further submitted that the objection of the respondent is that the claim of the petitioner is time barred and therefore, constitutes a non-arbitrable dispute and cannot be referred to arbitration. Accordingly, the present petition may be dismissed.

4. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties.

5. The existence of the agreement containing the arbitration clause, as well as the invocation of the said clause by issuance of notice, has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent. The only objection raised by the respondent is that the claim of the petitioner is time barred.

6. The aforesaid objection raised by learned counsel for the respondent is not sustainable in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SBI General Insurance Company Limited Vs. Krish Spinning, 2024 SCC Online SC 1754 and also another judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Re: Interplay between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, (2024) 6 SCC 1 and therefore, the law is no longer res integra. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in SBI General Insurance Company Limited’s case (Supra) is reproduced as under:-

“110. The scope of examination under Section 11(6-A) is confined to the existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section 7. The examination of validity of the arbitration agreement is also limited to the requirement of formal validity such as the requirement that the agreement should be in writing.

111. The use of the term ‘examination’ under Section 11(6-A) as distinguished from the use of the term ‘rule’ under Section 16 implies that the scope of enquiry under section 11(6-A) is limited to a prima facie scrutiny of the existence of the arbitration agreement, and does not include a contested or laborious enquiry, which is left for the arbitral tribunal to ‘rule’ under Section 16. The prima facie view on existence of the arbitration agreement taken by the referral court does not bind either the arbitral tribunal or the court enforcing the arbitral award.

112. The aforesaid approach serves a two-fold purpose – firstly, it allows the referral court to weed out nonexistent arbitration agreements, and secondly, it protects the jurisdictional competence of the arbitral tribunal to rule on the issue of existence of the arbitration agreement in depth.

113. Re