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2025 Supreme(Sikk) 120

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, J.
Rajendra Roy – Appellant  
Versus
State of Sikkim and Others –Respondent 
I.A. No.01 of 2025 in WP(C) No.34 of 2025
Decided on : 16-09-2025

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant :Dr. (Mrs.) Doma T. Bhutia, Senior Advocate with Ms. K. D. Bhutia, and Ms. Subaksha Pradhan, Advocates
For the Respondent:Mr. S. K. Chettri, Mr. Jorgay Namka, Senior Advocate with Mr. Lahang Limboo, Advocate Mr. Karma Thinlay, Senior Advocate with Mr. Yashir N. Tamang and Mr. Zamyang N. Bhutia, Advocates

Administrative authorities cannot arbitrarily relocate a licensed vendor under the guise of public convenience without specific statutory authority or a correct interpretation of judicial orders, as such actions infringe upon the constitutionally protected right to livelihood.

Headnote:(A) Constitution of India - Articles 19(1)(g) and 21 - Right to livelihood - Trade and business - Protection against arbitrary relocation of licensed street vendors.

(B) Administrative Actions - Scope of jurisdiction - Interference with personal rights - Misinterpretation of judicial directives - Necessity to demonstrate legal authority for mandatory relocation of commercial activities. (Paras 7, 8)

(C) Interlocutory Relief - Principles of balance of convenience - Irreparable loss - Protection of trade activities during pendency of litigation. (Para 8(ix), 8(x))

Facts of the case:
The petitioner, a licensed street vendor, challenged administrative directives that sought to relocate his business based on complaints by private individuals regarding the obstruction of ingress and egress to premises. The authorities claimed the relocation was necessitated by the congestion of a public thoroughfare and asserted it was in compliance with previous judicial observations. The petitioner contended that such relocation compromised his livelihood and lacked proper statutory authority.

Findings of Court:
The court determined that the administrative authorities lacked the necessary legal jurisdiction to mandate relocation without valid justification. It noted that previous judicial directives had been misinterpreted by the respondents to force the petitioner to move. The court held that the documentation, despite failing to specify the exact location, authorized the trade, and the balance of convenience tilted significantly in favour of the petitioner to prevent irreparable injury to his livelihood.

Issues: Whether administrative authorities possess the power to unilaterally relocate a licensed vendor based on complaints of obstructing public access, and whether the respondent authorities correctly interpreted existing judicial orders regarding the vendor's site.

Ratio Decidendi: Administrative interference with the constitutionally guaranteed right to trade through arbitrary relocation is unsustainable. Where a valid license to carry on business exists, authorities cannot rely on misconstrued court orders to enforce displacement without clear statutory sanction or a demonstrated, verified necessity of public interest.

Result: Application allowed; the contested administrative orders are suspended, and the petitioner is permitted to maintain his existing business location pending final adjudication.

Table of Content
1. factual background leading to the current interim application request. (Para 1 , 2 , 7)
2. conflicting contentions regarding obstruction of access and interpretation of hawker licenses. (Para 3 , 4 , 5)
3. analysis of administrative jurisdictional overreach and interpretation of previous court orders. (Para 6 , 8)
4. grant of interim relief while mandating access to private property. (Para 9 , 10)

ORDER (ORAL) :

Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.

1. Heard on I.A. No.01 of 2025 which is an application filed by the Petitioner seeking the following reliefs;

(a) Issue an ad-interim injunction, suspending the operation and effect of the impugned orders dated May 14, 2025 and May 31, 2025, issued by the Respondents No.2 and 3 (Annexure P1 and P2).

(b) To allow the Petitioner to continue their business to usual location, duly consideration the provisions of Articles 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India until the final disposal of this Writ Petition;

(c) To pass such order or orders as this Hon‟ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice.”

2. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner while narrating the facts of the Petitioner‟s case has walked this Court specifically through the impugned Orders as well as the interim Order of the Learned Single Judge of this High Court dated 22-11-2021, in WP(C) No.39 of 2021, the Order dated 09-08-2023 and clarificatory Order dated 20-10-2023 in the same Writ Petition. It is submitted that, the interim order of this High Court recognises that, the livelihood of the Petitioner was at stake and therefore a temporary space was to be designated to the Petitioner to carry on his business of hawking goods. Pursuant thereto, on 15-04-2023, the licence of the Petitioner was renewed by the Gangtok Municipal Corporation (GMC, Respondent No.3). Following this development, the Petitioner intimated the Municipal Commissioner that his licence has been renewed and that he had occupied the same space as earlier, for hawking his goods. After the renewal of his licence, the private Respondents filed I.A. No.04 of 2023, in WP(C) No.39 of 2021, seeking a clarification of the interim order dated 09-08-2023. The clarification was given by the Learned Single Judge, on 20-10-2023. After such clarification, the private Respondents had apparently approached the Respondent No.3 (GMC) complaining against the occupation by the Petitioner. The Respondent No.3 (GMC), vide order dated 12-06-2024, informed the private Respondent No.5 (Kiran Devi) herein, that it had examined the matter in detail and the dispute being civil in nature, advised the Respondent No.5 (Kiran Devi), to approach the Civil Court. Aggrieved by this Order, the private Respondents No.4 and 5, i.e., Sharda Devi Agarwal and Kiran Devi, sent a communication to the Municipal Commissioner- cum-Chairperson, Town Vending Committee, on 30-11-2024. This communication was not responded to, instead the Petitioner was summoned by the Office of the District Magistrate (Respondent No.2) evidently based on the letter of the private Respondents (supra) to the Municipal Commissioner. It is submitted by Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, that, the Counsel appearing before the Respondent No.2 (District Magistrate) for the Petitioner, was informed verbally that, the Complaint being considered by the Respondent No.2 (District Magistrate), was one addressed to the Municipal Commissioner. After the parties were heard, the impugned Order (Annexure P1) was pronounced by Respondent No.2 (District Magistrate). It is submitted by Learned Senior Counsel, that, the Respondent No.2 (District Magistrate) exceeded his jurisdiction by issuing the impugned order, giving directions to the Respondent No.3 (GMC) regarding the removal of the Petitioner from his hawking space and relocating him. Upon the direction of the Respondent No.2 (District Magistrate), the Respondent No.3 (GMC), vide Notice dated 31-05-2025, directed the Petitioner to remove his hawking stall fr

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