The main legal point established in the judgment is the need for a justice-oriented approach and the consideration of larger public interest in condoning the delay, as well as the interpretation of legal provisions related to limitation and condonation of delay.

( 1 ) THIS writ petition has been field against the order dated 25-7-1997, passed by the III Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad dismissing the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in Misc. Case No. 290 of 1995, NOIDA v. Atar Singh, wherein the appeal was preferred against the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 10-8-1986.

( 2 ) FACTS and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioner appellant filed an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge against the order of the Prescribed Authority passed under the U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupant) Act, 1972 (hereinafter called the Act 1972), along with an application for condonation of delay of 21 days. The appeal ought to have been filed reckoning the period of getting the certified copy of this order by 16/08/1995 but it could be filed only on 6th Sept. 1995. The application has been rejected on the ground that no sufficient cause was shown and appellant did not furnish explanation for each days delay. Hence this petition.

( 3 ) SHRI Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the delay of 21 days occurred because the authority took some time in inter-departmental proceeding. Though expiration of the period of delay had been explained from the last date of filing the appeal till the date of filing the same. More so, being a case of the State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution as it represented the larger public interest the delay ought to have condoned. The delay occurred because the Chief Legal Adviser of the petitioner had been very busy before this Court as a large number of matters had been listed during that period, and the delay of 21 days was unintentional and ought to have been condoned.

( 4 ) 4. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the delay has to be explained for each day from the date of decision till the date of filing the appeal and as no satisfactory explanation has been furnished before the appellate Court, this Court should not interfere.

( 5 ) ). I have considered the rival submission made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

( 6 ) THERE was a delay of 21 days for which explanation had been furnished by the petitioner-appellant that the Chief Legal Adviser was busy before this Court as large number of important matters had been pending and delay was unintentional and inter-departmental proceeding also took some time.

( 7 ) THE issues of limitation, delay and laches as well as condonation of such delay are being examined and explained every day by the Courts.

( 8 ) ). The Honble Supreme Court, in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353, observed that when substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the reason that other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay.

( 9 ) ). The law of limitation is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation ). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.

( 10 ) ). Time barred cases should not be entertained by Courts as the rights which have accrued to others by reason of delay in approaching the Court, cannot be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. The vested rights of the parties should not be disrupted at the instance of a person who is a guilty of culpable negligence. (Vide R. S. Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 259; and K. R. Mudgal v. R. P. Singh, AIR 1986 SC 2086 ). The Privy Council, in General Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, AIR 1941 PC 6, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in T