Procedural law can be amended with retrospective effect and will apply to pending cases.

( 1 ) I have heard Shri K. K. Arora for the appellant and Sri Trioki Nath for the respondents.

( 2 ) THIS second appeal was filed by the defendant against the appellate decree dated 6-5-2002. It is admitted position that on the date the first appeal was decided, the second appeal against the decree was maintainable under S. 100, C. P. C. However, S. 102, c. P. C. has been substituted by C. P. C. Amendment Act No. 22 of 2002 enforced w. e. f. 1-7-2002 to provide that no second appeal shall lie from any decree, when the subject-matter of the original suit is for recovery of money not exceeding twenty-five thousand rupees.

( 3 ) IT is not disputed that this second appeal is covered by this section and a preliminary objection has been raised by Shri tirloki Nath that this second appeal is not maintainable. As against this it has been argued by Shri K. K. Arora, learned counsel for the appellant that the right of appeal accrued to him on the date of the judgment of the first appellate Court, which was delivered prior to 1-7-2002. That therefore, this right can be exercised now and S. 102, C. P. C. does not bar this second appeal.

( 4 ) IT has further been argued by the learned counsel that against the judgment of the appellate Court he filed a writ petition in the High Court in which it was held that the appellant may prefer second appeal under S. 100, C. P. C. , therefore, writ petition is not maintainable and it was accordingly dismissed. That for this reason also this second appeal be admitted.

( 5 ) THE learned counsel has argued that the right to appeal is a substantive right which accrued at the date of institution of the suit. That such a vested right cannot be taken away by procedural amendment. It has therefore, been argued that S. 102. C. P. C. does not bar the second appeal in which the right of second appeal accrued prior to the enforcement of this amended section.

( 6 ) LEARNED counsel has referred to S. 6 of General Clauses Act and argued that the right, which had accrued, is protected under cl. (c) and the legal remedy is also protected under Cl. (e ). It is proper to refer the above clauses which are as follows :6. Effect of repeal Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not (a) and (b ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing act or Regulation had not been passed.

( 7 ) THE learned counsel in support of the argument has referred to the decision of the apex Court in Jose Da Costa v. Bascora, AIR 1975 SC 1843. The facts of the case were totally different, however, reliance has been placed in the observation of the Apex Court made in para 28 of the judgment which is as follows : "before ascertaining the effect of the enactments aforesaid passed by the Central legislature on pending suits or appeals, it would be appropriate to bear in mind two well established principles. The first is that "while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. " The second is that a right of appeal being a substantive right the in