The principle of nemo debet esse judex in propria causa applies to disciplinary proceedings, and the disciplinary authority cannot be the complainant and the disciplinary authority in the same case.

( 1 ) THE order dated 31. 7. 1990 contained in Annexure-7 to the writ petition, has since been challenged in this writ petition.

( 2 ) MR. P. N. Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioner, had assailed the said order on the ground that the alleged charges in respect whereof the petitioner was subjected to disciplinary proceedings, were based on the complaint of the disciplinary authority being Mr. S. N. Srivastava. Sub-Divisional Officer, Bindaki, therefore, he having been the complainant, he could not have passed the order as disciplinary authority on the principle that both the complainant and the disciplinary authority had combined in one. He secondly contends that in the enquiry report dated 29. 6. 1990 the petitioner was found not guilty in respect of charge Nos, 1, 2 and 4. The petitioner was found guilty only of charge No. 3. According to the learned counsel, said charge no. 3 was not grave enough so as to warrant an order of removal from service. He also contended that none of the charges were so serious to warrant major penalty to removal from service. He next contended that the disciplinary authority had disagreed with the enquiry report and passed the order of punishment without giving any notice and opportunity of hearing of the petitioner. Since the disciplinary authority had disagreed with the enquiry report, it was not open to it to pass the order of punishment without affording an opportunity to the petitioner to show cause against the proposed punishment. He then contended that even the order of punishment is perverse inasmuch as from the impugned order, it appears that the disciplinary authority had relied on certain other materials which were thoroughly absent in the enquiry proceedings and had purported to have examined some witnesses behind the back of the petitioner. He further contended that those witnesses were not examined during the enquiry proceedings by the prosecution, neither they were called on by the delinquent. Therefore, it was not open to the disciplinary authority to examine those witnesses even without notice to the petitioner.

( 3 ) MR. Saxena had also furnished English translation of both Annexures-6 and 7 to the writ petition, a copy whereof was also handed over to Mr. K. R. Singh, learned standing counsel, who has not disputed correctness of the said English transiation.

( 4 ) MR. K. R, Singh. learned standing counsel, on the other hand, contended that it is always open to the Disciplinary Authority to disagree with the findings recorded in the enquiry report. The only requirement for the purpose is that he should assign reasons therefor. It is not necessary that a fresh opportunity is to be given to the delinquent when the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry report. He further contends that there is nothing perverse or illegal in the impugned order of punishment. The charges were grave enough to attract major punishment of removal from service. According to him, there were sufficient materials to prove the guilt of the petitioner against respective charges. He then contends that the question being a question of fact and the findings of the disciplinary authority being findings of fact, the same cannot be interfered with in writ Jurisdiction unless the same is perverse. According to him. there is no perversity in the impugned order and therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

( 5 ) 1 have heard both Mr. Saxena and Mr. K. R. Singh at length.

( 6 ) ADMITTEDLY, a complainant himself cannot be the disciplinary authority on the settled principle that one cannot be a Judge in his own cause. If the enquiry proceeding is initiated on the basis of the complaint made by the disciplinary authority, in that event the disciplinary authority cannot be a Judge in his own cause and pass the order of punishment. One Sri S. N. Srivastava, S. D. O. had passed the order of punishment. He himself was the complainant. Thus, the present case appears to be hit by the