IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
N. N. MITHAL, D. S. SINHA
COLLECTOR, VARANASI - Appellant
Versus
RAI PREM CHAND - Respondents
FIRST APPEAL 245 Of 1991
Decided On : 02/14/1992
LAND ACQUISITION ACT - APPEAL - LIMITATION - APPLICABILITY OF LIMITATION ACT - COURT ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION - APPEAL UNDER SECTION 54 OF THE LAND ACQUISITION ACT IS GOVERNED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE LIMITATION ACT, 1963.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, the State of U.P., filed an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, challenging the award of the court in a reference proceeding under Section 18 of the Act. The appeal was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, and the appellant did not file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of delay.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act is governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963. The court reasoned that although the Land Acquisition Act is a complete code in itself, it incorporates the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) for proceedings before the court. Since the award of the court is deemed to be a decree under Section 26(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, an appeal against the award is an appeal from an original decree and is subject to the provisions of the CPC, including the provisions of the Limitation Act.
Issues: 1. Whether an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act is governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963? 2. Whether the appellant's failure to file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of delay bars the appeal?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act is governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, because: - The Land Acquisition Act incorporates the provisions of the CPC for proceedings before the court. - The award of the court is deemed to be a decree under Section 26(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. - An appeal against the award is an appeal from an original decree and is subject to the provisions of the CPC, including the provisions of the Limitation Act. 2. The court held that the appellant's failure to file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of delay bars the appeal because: - Section 5 of the Limitation Act casts a duty on the courts to dismiss any application, suit, or appeal where the same appears to have been filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation. - Order 41, Rule 3-A of the CPC ordains that an appeal which is presented after the expiry of the period specified therefor must invariably be accompanied by an application supported by affidavit setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period.
Final Decision: The court rejected the memo of appeal as being barred by time.
( 1 ) THIS appeal under S. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act has been filed by the State of U. P. The appellant moved two applications at the time of filing this appeal. One application was for stay of execution of the decree and the other one for time to make good the deficient court fee. The second application was allowed and two months time was granted to pay up the court fee. The requisite court fee stamps were supplied on 16-9-1991. The other application could not be disposed of as the appeal was reported to be beyond time by 91 days. As yet, no application seeking condonation of delay under S. 5 Limitation Act has been filed.
( 2 ) THE respondents have also appeared by filing a caveat through Sri S. K. Garg, Advocate. The appellant seeks to justify the filing of the appeal without any application under S. 5 Limitation Act. It was urged that since an appeal under Sec. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act is not regulated by Limitation Act no application under S. 5 thereof was essential. It was further urged that even assuming that the appeal was governed by Limitation Act there was no prescribed period of Limitation for filing such an appeal. In view of these twin submissions it is urged that the appeal cannot be dismissed as barred by time.
( 3 ) THE pith and substance of the argument is that the Land Acquisition Act is a complete Act in itself and wherever it was so required the Act itself prescribes its own period of Limitation for performing the necessary acts thereunder. In such circumstances aid of Limitation Act cannot be sought unless it was specifically made applicable to proceedings under the Act. It was contended that no provision of Limitation Act, 1963 has been made applicable to Land Acquisition Act and therefore no plea as to bar of limitation can be raised to defeat an appeal under S. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act.
( 4 ) THE argument though apparently attractive cannot be sustained on a closer scrutiny. The scheme of the Land Acquisition Act will reveal that during the process of a acquisition the proceedings take place in two distinct forum. The initial proceedings falling under Part-II of the Act are taken before the collector while later part of the proceedings falling under Ch. III lie within courts domain. After the collector makes his award under Sec. 11 of the Act the claimant (erstwhile owner of the property under acquisition) is given the right to challenge the collectors award by making an application setting out the objection or grounds on which the collectors award is challenged. The collector is then under an obligation to refer this application to the Court along with a statement as prescribed by Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Proceedings before the Court on such reference are taken in open court as prescribed under Sec. 22. According to S. 26 the award must be in writing and signed by the Judge and shall specify the amount of compensation for the land and other things in accordance with S. 23 of the Act. S. 26 (2), however, creates a legal fiction and grants the status of a decree and judgment to the Courts award and the reasons for the award, respectively within the meaning of S. 2 (2) and 2 sub-clause (9) of the Civil P. C.
( 5 ) IN the background of this scheme of things we have to examine the question raised. It is undisputed that by virtue of S. 53 of the Act Civil P. C. applies to all proceedings before the Court save to the extent of any inconsistency with this Act. court as defined in S. 3 (d) means a "principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction" unless appropriate Govt. appoints a Special officer to perform the functions of the Court. The principal Civil Court of original civil jurisdiction is that of the District Judge as defined in Sec. 53 (5) of the General Clauses Act (Act No. X of 1897) and read with Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 the District Judge will also include the Additional District Judge.
( 6 ) THUS, so far as proceedings initiated in t
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