IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
B. D. Agarwal, J.
SHAFIQ AHMAD - Appellant
Versus
SAYEEDAN - Respondents
Second Appeal 2457 Of 1976
Decided On : 12/08/1983
TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882 - SECTION 111(D) - LEASE - DETERMINATION - SALE OF LEASED PROPERTY TO LESSEE - TENANCY MERGES WITH OWNERSHIP - AGREEMENT TO RECONVEY DOES NOT REVIVE TENANCY.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant purchased a property from the respondents under a registered sale deed. On the same date, the appellant executed an agreement to reconvey the property to the respondents upon receipt of Rs. 2,000/- within three years. The period was later extended to December 31, 1974, by a subsequent agreement. Despite notice from the respondents, the appellant did not execute the reconveyance. The respondents filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement to reconvey.
Finding of the Court:
The trial court decreed the suit for specific performance, finding that there was no fraud relating to the subsequent agreement dated 16-1-1974, that the suit was within the prescribed limitation, and that the respondents had been ready and willing to perform their part. The lower appellate court dismissed the appellant's appeal and specified that the respondents were entitled to recover possession along with specific performance of the agreement to reconvey.
Issues: 1. Whether the tenancy existing in favor of the appellant prior to the purchase of the property merged with ownership upon the sale of the property to the appellant? 2. Whether the agreement to reconvey executed by the appellant revived the tenancy? 3. Whether the agreement to reconvey was rendered void due to a material alteration? 4. Whether the respondents were ready and willing to perform their part under the contract?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Upon the sale of the property to the appellant, the interest of the lessor and the lessee in the whole of the property became vested at the same time in the appellant in his same capacity as an individual. As a result, the tenancy merged with ownership under Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 2. The mere execution of an agreement to reconvey title to the property acquired under a deed of sale is not sufficient to revive the tenancy. There must be an express or implied intention of the parties to retain the tenancy. 3. The addition of the words "wapsi mai qabzey ke kar doonga" in the agreement to reconvey did not constitute a material alteration, as it did not vary the rights, liabilities, or legal position of the parties as ascertained by the deed in its original state. 4. The respondents were ready and willing to perform their part under the contract, as evidenced by their notices to the appellant and their offer to pay the sale consideration.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed with costs.
( 1 ) THIS is a defendants second appeal.
( 2 ) ON January 23, 1971, the respondent and her husband. Mohammad Yasin (since dead)executed a sale in favour of the appellant under registered instrument for consideration of Rs. 2,000/- in respect of a portion in dispute of the house concerned. On the same date there was a separate agreement executed in writing by the appellant in the respondents favour stipulating that he would reconvey the property to the vendor on receipt of Rs. 2000/- within three years from the date of the agreement. The period was extended further up to December 31, 1974, by a subsequent agreement entered into on January 16, 1974 in writing. Despite notice from the vendor, the appellant did not execute reconveyance. The plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement. With these allegations the plaintiffs brought the suit for specific performance on Jan. 31, 1975.
( 3 ) IN defence the appellant admitted the execution of the deed of sale and the agreement dated 23-1-1971. In relation to the subsequent agreement, however, the plea taken was that he appended his thumb-mark under the impression that the time was being extended up to February 28, 1974. The contents of this agreement, according to him, are based upon fraud played against him, and the suit was barred by limitation. The plaintiffs had not always been ready and willing to perform their part under the contract. It was also pleaded that he had been a tenant of this portion and due to the agreement of reconveyance executed by him the tenancy is to he considered as subsisting.
( 4 ) THE trial court decreed the suit for specific performance on Aug. 5, 1970 finding that there was no fraud relating to the sub-sequent agreement dated 16-1-1974: that the suit was within prescribed limitation and that the plaintiffs had been ready and willing to perform their part. An appeal filed by the defendant was dismissed on December 4, 1976. The lower appellate court specified also that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover possession along with specific performance of the agreement to reconvey and that the tenancy in the appellants favour cannot be taken to susbsist.
( 5 ) SRI Murli Dhar, learned counsel for the defendant appellant, contends that in face of the agreement dated Jan. 23, 1971, to reconvey, the tenancy existing earlier in favour of the appellant is to be considered as still subsisting. The submission is that the intention of the parties governs and that regard being had to the great protection accorded under the general law to tenancy, it cannot be assumed that this was determined on the facts hereof, the contention cannot, in my view, be sustained either upon principle or on authority. There is no dispute that prior to the purchase made by him on January 23, 1971, the appellant was the tenant of the vendors in this premises. The sale made in his favour was absolute. In terms of Section 111 (d)of the Transfer of Property Act: "111. Determination of lease: A lease of immovable property determines:. . . . . (d) in case the interest of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property becomes vested at the same time in one person in the same right :. . . . . "
( 6 ) AS a result of the purchase the interest of the lessor and the lessee in the whole of the property in dispute became vested at the same time in the defendant-appellant in his same capacity as an individual. The owner normally has the right to use and enjoy the thing owned, the right to manage it, i. e. the right to decide how it shall be used and right to the income from it. The owner has a liberty to use the thing (See Sal-mond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edition, page 246 ). A lease is that form of encumbrance which consists in a right to the possession and use of property owned by some other person. It is the outcome of the separation of ownership and possession (ibid, page 424 ). This also follows from the definition of the expresssion lease given in
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