( 1 ) SHYAM Sunder Lal filed suit No. 139 of 1954 in the court of Munsif Unnao South, exercising jurisdiction of Judge Small Causes, claiming a decree for Rs. 240/- from Lakshmi Narain on account of rent from 1st of December, 1952 to 31st July, 1954. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was his tenant at Rs. 12/- per mensem and had not paid the amount despite demand. The defence was that the rent up to February, 1954 had been paid up. It was further pleaded that the agreement regarding payment of rent was itself void and the plaintiff could not recover the amount. The reason for the agreement being void was that it was entered into in contravention of the express provisions of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (U. P. Act III of 1947 ). The plaintiff refuted the suggestion that U. P. Act III of 1947 was applicable to the building and pleaded that the building had been constructed in january, 1951. The learned trial Judge thereupon framed the following issues:

1. Whether rent from 1st of December, 1952 to the end of February 1954 is due to the plaintiff or it has been paid off by the defendant as alleged? 2. Whether the contract of tenancy is void and unenforceable as alleged in para 9 of the written statement and the oral pleas? 3. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?

The learned trial Judge decided issue No. 1 in favour of the defendant and issue No. 2 against the plaintiff. He also held that the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act was applicable to the building in question. He accordingly dismissed the plaintiffs suit with costs. Against that judgment and decree, Shyam Sunder Lal plaintiff has filed this revision application under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The revision came up before a learned Single Judge and has been referred to a Bench as the learned Single Judge was of opinion that the question raised was one of general importance and may also require consideration of the constitutional right of the person to dispose of the property. That is how this revision application has been listed before us. In this revision application we have heard the learned counsel for the applicant and the learned counsel for the opposite party.

( 2 ) NO question of the validity of U. P. Act III of 1947 has been raised before us, nor was it at! any time raised in the trial court or even in the grounds of revision. We have, therefore, to confine ourselves to the interpretation of the provisions of U. P. Act III of 1947 and to determination whether letting had been forbidden by the District Magistrate under Section 7 (2) of U. P. Act III of 1947 and whether an agreement as regards letting out on rent is void and unenforceable in courts of law.

( 3 ) THE first contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that there is no absolute prohibition On letting. The contention of the learned counsel is that the whole intention of the act was to control the process of letting and not to deprive the owner of the building of the right to let it out to any one of his choice. The argument goes on to state that all the power that has been conferred on the District Magistrate or his delegate amounts to only a choice of the person to whom the accommodation must be let the learned counsels argument thus is that the purpose of the Act and the correct interpretation of its provisions is that a landlord has still the right and the power to let out accommodation but the choice of the person in whose favour this contract must be made has been limited by law and the power to choose a person to whom the accommodation must he given is now vested in the district Magistrate. The learned counsel draws our attention to the provisions of Section 7 of U. P. Act III of 1947. The section so far as it is relevant for our discussion reads:

"7. (1) (a) Every landlord shall. . . . . . . give notice of the vacancy in writing to the District magistrate. (b ). . . . . . . . . . . . .