( 1 ) THE question which has been referred to this Bench is :

"whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal under Section 417 (3), Cr. P. C. "

Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 417, read thus;" (3) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High court.

(4) No application under Sub-section (3) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of acquittal. " in Mohammad Ibrahim v. Gopi Lal, AIR 1958 All 691, the Court held that the terms of sub-section (4) showed clearly the intention of the Legislature that applications for leave to appeal against an order of acquittal must be made within sixty days of the order, and that the court had no power to extend that period. The correctness of this view was doubted in the later; case of Municipal Board, Luck-now v. Bhagwan Das, AIR 1959 All 500, in which it was held that in computing the period of sixty days the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order sought to be appealed from could be excluded under Section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act.

( 2 ) IN my opinion the answer to the question referred to us lies in a narrow compass. It is not contended, nor could it be successfully contended, that the provisions of Section 5 of the limitation Act apply only to an appeal or an application for a review of judgment or for leave to appeal for which a period of limitation is prescribed in the third eolumn of the first schedule to that Aet. It is the settled view of this Court that unless the word prescribed in the Limitation Act is qualified by appropriate words it means prescribed by any law : Durag Pal Singh v. Pancham singh, AIR 1939 All 403 (FB ). It is also common ground that unless (as held by this Court in Mohammad Ibrahims case, AIR 1958 All 691), the terms ofsection 417 (4) of the Code make manifest the intention of the legislature that the period of limitation shall not be extended, the provisions of Section 5 of the limitation Act will apply unless the Cr. P. C. is a special or local law within the meaning of section 29 of the former Act.

( 3 ) THE Cr. P. C. is clearly not a local law. The expression special law* has not been defined in the Limitation Act, but it is defined in Section 41 of the. P. C. as a law applicable to a particular subject; and that in my opinion is its essential moaning. The Madras High Court in Kandaswami pillai v. Kannappa Chetty, AIR 1952 Mad 186 (FB), was of opinion that the C. P. C. was a general and not a special law. When considering this question Rajamannar, C. J. , said

"i think that the expression "special law" which has not been defined in the Limitation Act was intended to cover only laws like the Rent Act of 1859 which was held by the Privy Council to be a complete Code in itself. In the ordinary sense "special" is used in antithesis to "general". A special Act as opposed to a general or public Act means one that is directed towards a special subject or special class of objects -- It is a specious argument to say that the C. P. C. deals with a particular subject, namely, procedure. The special law contemplated is the law which gives rise to special causes of action and which itself provides for the method of enforcement of rights conferred by that Act or for redress of injuries suffered by the Application of the provisions of that Act. The Provincial Insolvency Act, for instance, would be a special law; likewise the income-tax Act. The C. P. C. is not such a special law. It is a general law relating to procedure. "

With these observations I am, with great respect, in complete agreement, and applying the test stated by