( 1 ) CERTAIN persons were tried before the Sessions Judge of Mirzapur for offences under Sections 307, 324 and 148, I. P. C. found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment. They appealed to this court and were released on bail for the pendency of the appeal. The appeal came up for hearing before me. Dismissing it I maintained their conviction and sentences and ordered them to surrender forthwith. After duly surrendering they applied under Article 134 (1) (c) of the constitution for the grant of a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court. The required certificate was granted by me. They now pray for bail for the pendency of their appeal before the supreme Court.

( 2 ) THE case raises the question; does the High Court possess the power to grant bail to a convict, or suspend the execution of his sentence, after it has granted him a certificate of fitness under article 134 (1) (c), or indeed under Article 132 (1 ). The question is of considerable importance inasmuch as it and allied questions constantly arise before the High Courts; it is a controversial question inasmuch as the views of Individual Honble Judges on it are not uniform Having regard to the importance of the matter I have heard Mr. S. N. Mulla for the applicants and Mr. Shri rama for the State at considerable length.

( 3 ) IN urging that the High Court does possess the necessary power Mr. Mullas first line o argument is based on Chapter XXXIX and Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whereas Mr. Shri Rama contends that these provisions have no relevance to the matter of issue and that the only section in the Code which can apply is Section 426 but it is of no avail to the applicants.

( 4 ) NOW, for arriving at my own conclusion I propose to lean heavily on the classic judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Jairam Das v. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 94 (A), a decision which, if I may say so with the profoundest respect, still embodies sound law inasmuch as our Supreme Court has not disagreed with it hitherto. It might be pointed out that in those days there was no statutory provision for the grant by the High Court of a certificate of fitness to appeal, and convicted persons could only approach the Privy Council by way of special leave to appeal. In Jairam Dass case (A), the question was whether a High Court had power to grant bail to a person who had been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment and to whom His Majesty in council had given special leave to appeal against his conviction and sentence. The Privy Council in their judgment examined the various aspects of the question. Their Lordships observed that from a review of the authorities in India the several views which had prevailed could be summarised thus:

1. If leave to appeal has been obtained from His Majesty in Council and the Judicial Committee has said that an application for hail must be dealt with by the High Court, the latter will have power under Section 498 of the Code to release a convicted person on bail pending the hearing of his appeal; 2. the High Court has an inherent power to do so if special leave to appeal has been obtained from His Majesty in Council; 3. the High Court possesses no inherent power as regards bail; 4. after disposal of a criminal appeal by the High Court it is functus officio; has no longer any seisin of the case, and cannot grant bail to a convicted person unless special leave to appeal has been obtained from His Majesty an Council;

( 5 ) IN addition there must also be a direction received, from "their Lordships of the Privy council";

( 6 ) THE High Courts seisin of a criminal case, and its power to grant bail under Section 498 of the Code, is revived when the Judicial committee gives leave to appeal and directs the High Court.

5. Emphasising that they had never given any formal direction to a High Court on the matter, nor had any reference to bail been made in Orders in Council granting special leave to appeal, their Lordships s