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1956 Supreme(All) 91

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Kidwai and Randhir Singh, JJ.
MEHNGA RAM - Appellant
Versus
LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL OF INDIA AT LUCKNOW - Respondents
Civil Misc. Appln. 81 Of 1955
Decided On : 04/09/1956

Advocates Appeared:
BISHUN SINGH, H.D.Srivastava, Murzban Mistree, ONKAR SINGH

The Appellate Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal on a question of fact.

Headnote:

INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES - Reference of disputes - Industrial Tribunal - Jurisdiction - Appellate Tribunal - Jurisdiction - Standing Orders - Applicability - Misconduct - Dismissal of workmen - Permission - Discretion of Tribunal - Interference by Appellate Tribunal - Certiorari - Grounds.

Fact of the Case:

The Patiala Cement Works and its employees had strained relations. A Conciliation Board was appointed but failed to resolve the disputes. On 5-11-1951, the Rajpramukh of the State of Pepsu issued a Notification under Section 10 (1) (c) Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947) referring the disputed points to the Industrial Tribunal. By a subsequent Notification dated 10-1-1952, the number of matters referred to arbitration was increased. Later, it was discovered that these Notifications were defective inasmuch as, although the points referred were common to all the workmen, the parties to the dispute were stated to be the Management of the Bhupendra Cement Works and certain workers. Accordingly, on 23-8-1952, another Notification was issued superseding the earlier notifications and referring to the Tribunal an industrial dispute "between the workmen and the management of the Bhupendra Cement Works."

Finding of the Court:

1. The Appellate Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the appeals from the decision of the Industrial Tribunal in the cases of the workmen who had filed the present applications. 2. The findings of the Industrial Tribunal in all the cases were not findings of fact and consequently the Labour Appellate Tribunal had authority to entertain an appeal in any case. 3. The Appellate Tribunal erred in entertaining the appeal on a question of fact. 4. The Appellate Tribunal acted without jurisdiction in the matter to which Civil Misc. Applns. (O. J.) Nos. 82, 84, 87 and 89 of 1955 relate. 5. The Appellate Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and there was no error of jurisdiction committed by it in the matter to which Civil Misc. Applns. (O. J.) Nos. 81, 83, 85 and 88 of 1955 relate. 6. The Appellate Tribunal committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record in holding that there were no proceedings pending before any tribunal till 23-8-1952, when a proper Notification was issued. 7. The Appellate Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction to hear the appeal on question of law in the matter to which Civil Misc. Applns. (O. J.) Nos. 81, 83, 85 and 88 of 1955 relate. 8. The Appellate Tribunal has not committed any error of law at all in holding that a worker may be guilty of acts subversive of discipline even if those acts are done outside the premises of the factory and out of working hours.

Issues: 1. Whether the Appellate Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the appeals from the decision of the Industrial Tribunal in the cases of the workmen who had filed the present applications? 2. Whether the findings of the Industrial Tribunal in all the cases were findings of fact and consequently the Labour Appellate Tribunal had authority to entertain an appeal in any case? 3. Whether the Appellate Tribunal erred in entertaining the appeal on a question of fact? 4. Whether the Appellate Tribunal acted without jurisdiction in the matter to which Civil Misc. Applns. (O. J.) Nos. 82, 84, 87 and 89 of 1955 relate? 5. Whether the Appellate Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and there was no error of jurisdiction committed by it in the matter to which Civil Misc. Applns. (O. J.) Nos. 81, 83, 85 and 88 of 1955 relate? 6. Whether the Appellate Tribunal committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record in holding that there were no proceedings pending before any tribunal till 23-8-1952, when a proper Notification was issued? 7. Whether the Appellate Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction to hear the appeal on question of law in the matter to which Civil Misc. Applns. (O. J.) Nos. 81, 83, 85 and 88 of 1955 relate? 8. Whether the Appellate Tribunal has committed any error of law at all in holding that a worker may be guilty of acts subversive of discipline even if those acts are done outside the premises of the factory and out of working hours?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal is derived from Section 7 (1), Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act. Clause (b) of that sub-section permits appeals without any limitations in the numerous matters therein enumerated. The appeals in the cases of the workmen who have filed the present applications did not relate to any of these matters. The appeals could, therefore, only be entertained, if at all, under Clause (a) of the sub-section which is as follows: "the appeal involves any substantial question of law." 2. No Tribunal of inferior jurisdiction can by its own decision finally decide on the question of the existence or extent of such jurisdiction such question is always subject to review by the High court, which does not permit the inferior tribunal either to usurp a jurisdiction which it does not possess, whether at all or to the extent claimed, or to refuse to exercise a jurisdiction which it has and ought to exercise. 3. The Appellate Tribunal thus clearly erred in entertaining the appeal on a question of fact. 4. Section 33, Industrial Disputes Act provides that if the employer wanted to alter the status quo, he had to get the express permission either of the conciliation officer, Board or Tribunal, as the case may be. Therefore, when the Industrial Tribunal refused to grant permission, it exercised a discretion conferred upon it by Section 33; and the very narrow question that arises for determination is that, when a court upon which discretion is conferred exercises that discretion, under what circumstances is an Appellate Tribunal entitled to interfere on the ground that a substantial question of law arises with regard to the exercise of that discretion. 5. The Appellate Tribunal has given no adequate reasons for interfering with the discretion of the Industrial Tribunal. 6. The cessation of work even for 15 or 20 minutes by the workers in combination is a strike within the scope of Section 2 (q), Industrial Disputes Act. However, in this case, the appropriate government had originally referred a dispute between the management of the Bhupendra cement Works and "certain workers." The Industrial Tribunal (District and Sessions Judge of kandaghat) was directed to give his award within 2 months. Later after the expiry of two months on 9-1-1952, a larger number of disputes were referred to the same Tribunal but the parties to the dispute were described in the same manner and the time for making the adjudication was not extended. The Appellate Tribunal has itself held that the reference was defective and that the. Tribunal could not proceed with the adjudication. This must be so because, in view of the words used to describe the opposite party "certain workmen" it could not be predicated of any particular workman that he was a party to the proceedings. The consequence was that one of the parties to the dispute was unknown. It follows that there was no proper reference and that there were, in law, no proceedings pending on this reference before any Tribunal till 23-8-1952, when a proper Notification was issued. The strike was not, therefore, illegal within the meaning of Section 23 (b), Industrial Disputes Act. 7. The Industrial Tribunal found that "a sort of demonstration took place in the premises of the works on 12-8-1952; and that certain slogans were shouted." It also found that the workmen dispersed and resumed work of their own accord "after shouting a few meaningless slogans" and that "their purpose was only to show a sort of displeasure for the prolongation of the proceedings before the Tribunal consequent upon a defective Notification of the Government." In the result the Industrial Tribunal did not see fit in the exercise of its discretion, to accord permission to dismiss the workmen. The Appellate Tribunal somehow or other assumed that the workers indulged in acts of rowdyism of which it took a serious view -- The judgment of the Appellate Tribunal does not indicate on what materials it came to this conclusion or why it felt it necessary to differ from the finding of the Industrial Tribunal that meaningless slogans were shouted and the incident was of a minor and technical nature. 8. The Appellate Tribunal has found as a matter of law that a worker may be guilty of acts subversive of discipline even if those acts are done outside the premises of the factory and out of working hours. In this it has not committed any error of law at all.

Final Decision: 1. The orders of the Appellate Tribunal dated 17-3-1955 against which Civil Misc. Applns. (O. J.) Nos. 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88 and 89 of 1955 are directed are quashed. 2. Civil Misc. Appln. (O. J.) No. 86 of 1955 is dismissed with costs.

KIDWAI, J.

( 1 ) THE relations between the Patiala Cement Works and its employees were not satisfactory. A conciliation Board was appointed but it failed to resolve the disputes. Accordingly, on 5-11-1951, H. H. the Rajpramukh of the State of Pepsu issued a Notification under Section 10 (1) (c) Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947) referring to the Industrial Tribunal the disputed points.


"by a subsequent Notification dated 10-1-1952, the number of matters referred to arbitration was increased. Later it seems to have been discovered that these Notifications were defective inasmuch as, although the points referred were common to all the workmen, the parties to the dispute were stated to be the Management: of the Bhupendra Cement Works and certain workers. Accordingly on the 23-8-1952 another Notification was issued superseding the earlier notifications and referring to the Tribunal an industrial dispute "between the workmen and the management of the Bhupendra Cement Works. "

( 2 ) IN the meanwhile, on 12-8-1952, it must now be accepted as a fact in view of the findings of the Industrial Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal, that some of the workers, including Mahnga ram, Janak Raj Soni, Harchand Singh and Daulat Singh, stopped work for a short time after they had commenced it. In the charge sheets that were delivered to these persons by the Management immediately they were not charged with having struck work themselves but were accused of having incited others to strike and of having done some acts subversive of discipline. Nevertheless, in the application made against each worker separately to the Industrial Tribunal it was alleged that there had been a strike for half an hour which was illegal in view of Section 23 (b) Industrial Disputes Act. It was further alleged that the workers had been guilty of inciting others to strike and of acts subversive of discipline within the meaning of Standing Order 16 (iii)and (ix ). Other allegations were also made and it was prayed under Section 33 Industrial disputes Act that leave be given to discharge the workman whose conduct was complained of.

( 3 ) ALTHOUGH the Management presented an application against each workman separately, the workmen submitted a joint reply through their General Secretary. They pleaded that there had been no strike and no inflammatory speeches but that, in accordance with a resolution passed by the workers at a meeting held on 11-8-1952, the workmen while going to work had shouted slogans to the effect that the disputes should be settled urgently and that the tribunal should give an early decision. They denied that there had been any slogans against the Government or the management or that any meeting was held on 12-8-1952, and though they admitted that there had been a delay of 15 or 20 minutes in going to work, they denied that this was the result of any concerted action.

( 4 ) THE Tribunal disposed of all the applications by one judgment and held that, althongh there was some demonstration on the premises of the Works on 12-8-1952, that did not amount to a strike within the meaning of Section 2 (q) Industrial Disputes Act since there was no concerted action with a view to securing a stoppage of work. It was also held that the shouting of slogans although directed against the Management should not have been taken seriously by the management since the resentment was against the defective Notification for which the management was not responsible. The Industrial Tribunal felt that in the interest of peace it was desirable that good relations between the Management and the workmen should be restored and that this could not be done if the workers were allowed to be dismissed. It accordingly refused to grant permission to dismiss the workers.


( 5 ) THE Cement Works appealed but they filed only one appeal impleading all the workmen as opposite parties. The Appellate Tribunal noted the circumstances in which only one appeal was filed and proceeded to dispose of it. The




















































































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