( 1 ) I agree, but as we are differing from Bhargava J. I desire to state briefly my reasons for so doing.

( 2 ) THE two important questions in this case are, firstly, whether the proviso which appears at the foot of Sub-section (1) of Section 7-A is limited in its application to that sub-section, and, secondly, whether the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could by his order dated 22-12-1952, revoke his earlier order of the 6-11-1952.

( 3 ) THE proviso is in these terms:

"provided that no order under this section shall be passed if the District Magistrate is satisfied that there has been undue delay or it is otherwise inexpedient to do so. "

The proviso in terms empowers the District Magistrate to refrain from passing any order which he is empowered to make under Section 7-A if he think it inexpedient to do so, and the only difficulty in giving full effect to the proviso is due to the fact that it has been placed after sub-section (1 ). I do not however think that this is a sufficient reason for restraining the application of the proviso to order which the District Magistrate is empowered to make under that sub-section. It appears to me that the necessity for vesting the District Magistrate with a discretion as to whether an order should be made is no less strong in the case of orders which he make under sub-sections (2) and (3) than it is in respect of orders under Sub-section (1 ). Indeed it would appear more necessary, that he should have a discretion in deter mining whether a person should be directed to vacate certain premises or in ordering that a per-son be evicted from premises of which he is in occupation than he should have in deciding whether a notice to show cause should issue. In my opinion, the proviso is intended to be a proviso to the first three sub-sections of Section 7-A and not a proviso to Sub-section (1) alone. I agree therefore that the order made by the Rent control and Eviction Officer on 6-11-1952, refusing to direct the appellants eviction from the premises indispute was an order which he had jurisdiction to make.

( 4 ) ON 7-12-1952, the District Magistrate passed an order as a consequence of which the Rent control and Eviction Officer on 22-12-1952, revoked his earlier order of the 3th November refusing to direct the ejectment of the appellant under Sub-section (3) of Section 7-A. No copy of the District Magistrates order has been filed, but it appears clear from the Rent control and Eviction Officers order of the 22nd December that although he says that he has given the matter careful thought his decision that the appellant should be evicted was not that at which he would have arrived had it not been for the directions or orders he had received from the district Magistrate. Indeed it was not seriously contended before us that in making this order the Rent Control and eviction Officer exercised his own discretion or acted otherwise than in accordance with the directions of the District Magistrate.

( 5 ) IT is a well established rule that a Court has no power to set aside an order which has been properly made unless it has been given by statute, and this is so on the principle that it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation. That rule, in my opinion, applies equally to a final order made in quasi-judicial proceedings, and proceedings under Section 7a are of that character : Shri Shri Nath v. Commr. of Allahabad Division, Allahabad, Writ Petn. No. 7563 of 1951, D/- 27-7-1951 (All) (A ). The rule is subject to certain exceptions to which reference has been made by my brother in Debi prasad v. Khelawan, Special Appeal No. 141 of 1954, D/- 30-9-1955 (All) (B ). They have no application in the present case. Sub-section (4) of Section 7-A provides that no appeal shall lie from an order passed by the District Magistrate or by an officer authorised by him to perform any of his functions under the Act, but a power of revision is vested in the Commissioner. I think it