( 1 ) THE plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for possession of a share of the property left by one Bhoop singh who died in the year 1882. Bhoop Singh had a son Megh Singh and also left a widow srimati Janki Kunwar. Mutation was effected in the village papers half and half in the names of janki Kunwar and Megh Singh. Megh Singh died in 1901 and his eight-annas share in the property was mutated in favour of his widow, Srimati Lal Kunwar, and his son, Rustam, half and half. On Rustams death in 1903 Lal Kunwars name was recorded on that four-annas share also, with the result that Janki Kunwars name remained recorded over eight-annas share and Lal kunwars name over the remaining eight-annas. In 1910 Janki Kunwar died leaving a daughter and a daughters son, who are defendants to this suit. They claimed mutation over the eight-annas share which had been entered in the name of janki Kunwar, and Lal Kunwar objected and claimed that the entire property had come to her by inheritance. Lal Kunwars objection was dismissed, but she filed an appeal. During the pendency of the appeal on 23-6-1910, the parties entered into a compromise by which the defendants were given a one-third share in the property and the remaining two-thirds was mutated in the name of lal Kunwar. On 20-9-1930, Lal Kunwar surrendered the entire inheritance to the plaintiff, eaghuraj Singh, her daughters son. Lal Kunwar died in 1941, and on 3-10-1942, Eaghuraj Singh filed a suit for recovery of the one-third share that the defendants had got under the compromise dated 23-6-1910.

( 2 ) THE defendants raised the plea that the suit was barred by limitation as the plaintiff could have filed a suit for possession after the surrender in his favour on 20-9-1930.

( 3 ) THE learned single Judge came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs cause of action for a suit for possession having accrued on 20-9-1930, the suit was barred by limitation.

( 4 ) MR. Ambika Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant, has urged that the defendants were entitled to remain in possession of the property till 1941 when Lal Kunwar died and the plaintiffs cause of action, therefore, arose on Lal Kunwars death in 1941, and as such the suit was not barred by limitation. Learned counsel has relied on the judgment of Boys J. and certain observations in the judgment of Sulaiman J. in Lachmi Chand v. Lachoo, 49 ALL. 334. He has ,also relied on the judgment of this Court in Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji, A. I. R. 1936 ALL. 422. In both these cases it was held that when a widow had made a transfer of her life-estate, even though the transfer may not be binding on the reversioners on her actual death, if she has surrendered the estate, the reversioner could get the property subject to the transfer made by the widow and could, therefore, claim possession only on the termination of the life-estate, that is, on her death Boys J. in Lachmi Chands case, 49 ALL. 334 observed that the doctrine of surrender having been imported into Hindu Law by judicial decision, he was entitled, in the absence of authority to the contrary, to import the complementary rule, essential to the prevention of fraud, that the widow could not by making a surrender defeat rights created by herself and creation of which was within her authority, and the reversioner could not claim on the basis of the surrender to defeat such rights. Sulaiman J. clearly pointed out the fallacy behind this reasoning. He quoted observations of Lord Morris in Behari Lal v. Madho Lall, 19 Cal. 236 to the following effect :

"it may be accepted that, according to Hindu law, the widow can accelerate the estate of the heir by conveying absolutely and destroying her life-estate,"

and again the observations of Lord Dunedin in Rangaswami v. Nachiappa, 42 Mad. 523 (P. C. ). "it is settled by long practice and confirmed by decision that a Hindu widow can renounce in favour of the nearest reversions, if there be only one, or of all the reversioners nearest in degree, if mo