JUDGMENT

Grimwood Mears, C.J. - In this case the appellant applied u/s 5 of the Limitation Act and asked that a time-barred appeal might be heard on the ground that there was 'sufficient cause' for his having failed to comply with the rules. When a second appeal is presented to this Court, there is no doubt that the copy of the first court's judgment and a copy of the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court must be filed. The appellant waited until almost the last day for the admission of his appeal, and then, on the 2nd of May, 1921 filed the judgment and decree only of the lower appellate court. The last day of limitation expired on the 3rd of May, 1921. The appellant, having learnt that the appeal could not be admitted without the judgment of the first court, subsequently obtained it and then asked that time should be extended and the appeal admitted. It is stated that his failure to comply with the rules was due to the error of the vakil, in the district, who had informed him that the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court were alone necessary.

2. We believe that this is what actually happened, and, therefore, the question arises whether that explanation can in the year 1922 be accepted as sufficient cause. There is no doubt it was the practice in past years to allow applications of this kind, and between 1903 and 1907 distinguished Judges of this Court did absolve the applicant from the consequences of an error on the part of his legal practitioner. See Wazir Ali Khan v. Zainab Weekly Notes 1903 p. 32 Kura Mal v. Ram Nath ILR (1906) All. 414 and Anjora Kunwat v. Babu I.L.R.(1907) All. 638.

3. In 1914 the case of Dewan v. Buddhu (1914) XII L.L.J. 837 came before Sir Sunder Lal on appeal from the District Judge who had admitted a time-barred appeal. The circumstances under which the omission to file the appeal within time took place were not very clearly put forward by the applicant but it "was not suggested that there was any misapprehension on the part of Mr. Weston (the counsel employed to file the appeal) as to the time within which the appeal ought to have been lodged." Sir SUNDER LAL thinking that the explanation of the delay was "utterly inadequate," overruled the decision of the District Judge. That case is, therefore, clearly distinguishable; from the present one, and notably from the decision of Stanley, C.J., and Banerji, J., in Kura Mal v. Ram Nath ILR (1906) All. 414. On appeal a Bench of this Court upheld the decision of Sir SUNDER LAL on the ground that the lower appellate court had no materials upon which a discretion could be exercised: Buddhu v. Diwan (1915) XIII L.L.J. 268.

4. During the hearing of this application it was suggested, by Mr. Justice Stuart, that the more correct principle was that laid down in the English decisions by which a default by the legal practitioner is not held to be a sufficient cause for extending the time for an appeal. Except for expressions of regret on the part of Collins, M.R., and Cozens Hardy, L.J., in the case of Coles v. Ravenshear (1907) 1 K.B. 1, the current of English decisions is consistent and the result may be summarized in the words of Davey, L.J., who in In re Helsby (1894) 1 Q.B., 742 concluded his judgment by saying "I cannot see that a mistake made by a solicitor of the party who is applying for an extension of time is sufficient ground for extending it."

5. The English Courts have laid stress upon the fact that the proposed respondent to an appeal has a right to hold his judgment and that such right ought not to be interfered with after the lapse of the prescribed time, unless there are special-circumstances.

6. The question which is to be decided is one of policy. If this Court decides to break away from its decisions, pronounced during the period 1903 to 1907, it will not mean that these cases were wrongly decided at the time that they were so decided. In the past 15 years, legal education has progressed in this country and courts are right in