ORDER

Rachhpal Singh, J. - These are two connected revision applications which can be conveniently disposed of together. In connexion with a murder charge Chhote Lal and Nazim Husain made statements before a Magistrate. Khan Bahadur Syed Muhammad Isa, the complainant, alleged that these statements were defamatory towards him and in connexion with them he filed complaints against Chhote Lal and Nazim Husain u/s 500, I.P.C. The learned trial Magistrate was of opinion that the complaints of the complainant were incompetent. According to his view, no case could be started against the two accused persons unless there was a complaint made by the judicial officer before whom the alleged defamatory statements were made. The two complaints were dismissed. The applicant filed revisions before the learned Sessions Judge who summarily rejected them. The applicant has now come up in revision before this Court.

2. Two points arise for consideration in this case. The first is whether the statements made by the accused persons during the judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged and for that reason the complaints by the complainant were incompetent. The second is whether a complaint could be made by a private person without the sanction of the Magistrate before whom the alleged defamatory statements were made. I will at first deal with the first point. I do not think that the statements made in judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. In Ganga Prasad v. Banke Lal (1907) 29 All 685 a Full Bench of this Court held that

the question of criminal liability of a witness for defamation for statements made in course of their depositions must be decided by what is laid down in the Indian Penal Code without regard to the state of law in England or considerations of what would be desirable in the interest of public policy and administration of justice.

3. The majority view in this Full Bench was that when a witness makes a statement which is defamatory of a third party in a judicial proceeding he can be convicted of defamation. In Bai Shanta Vs. Umrao Amir Malek, AIR 1926 Bom 141 , a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court held that the statement made by a witness in judicial proceedings was not absolutely protected from being made the subject of a prosecution for defamation u/s 500, I.P.C., on the ground of public policy or exceptions derived from the common law of England, apart from the provisions of Section 499, I.P.C. In view of these two Full Bench rulings, I am of opinion that the view taken by the learned trial Magistrate is not correct. It appears to me to be quite clear that so far as this Court is concerned it is well settled as a result of the Full Bench ruling referred to above that there is no absolute privilege and that a person making a defamatory statement in the course of a judicial proceeding can be prosecuted for defamation. This view is supported by the Full Bench ruling of the Bombay High Court referred to above.

4. As regards the second question also I am of opinion that the decision of the trial Magistrate cannot be sustained. If we read the provisions of Sections 195 and 476, Criminal P.C., it will appear that there is nothing which prevents a man from making a complaint for defamation in respect of a statement made during judicial proceedings. It may be that where a false statement is made the person making the statement is liable for prosecution on two counts if the statement happens to be defamatory. On the complaint of the complainant he can be prosecuted for defamation and he can further be prosecuted u/s 211 or 193, I.P.C. So far as charges under Sections 211 and 193, I.P.C., are concerned, it is clear that no prosecution can be started unless a complaint is made by the judicial officer before whom the false statement is made. But in the matter of defamation the Magistrate on his own authority cannot take any initiative. He has no power to say that a person should be prosecuted for defamation because he has made a defam