JUDGMENT

Raghubar Dayal, J. - This is a judgment-debtor's appeal against an order of the Civil Judge, Bareilly, partly dismissing his objection to the execution of a decree against him in favour of the respondent to the effect; that the application for the execution of the decree was time barred.

2. The simple money decree in suit was passed on 11-5-1932 for Rs. 7500. The decree allowed instalments of us. 25 a month. It provided :

"If the defendant fails to pay three consecutive instalments, the plaintiff will he at liberty to realise the whole decretal amount in one lot."

Instalments falling due on 11-7-1932 or thereafter were not paid.

3. The decree-holder applied on 5-9-1934 for the execution of the decree with respect to the entire decretal amount. This application was dismissed without satisfaction. Three other applications with similar prayers were similarly disposed of. The present application is the fifth application for execution, and was presented on 21-4-1945. It may be just noted here that these five execution applications were all presented within three years of the respective previous application.

4. The objection of the judgment-debtor was that the execution application was time barred on account of the provisions of Section 48, Civil P. C. This objection was accepted by the learned Civil Judge, who held that the application for the realisation of the entire decretal amount was time barred in view of the right to apply for such execution having accrued more than 12 years prior to the institution of this application for execution. The decree-holder has submitted to this order.

5. The learned Civil Judge, however, considered the application for execution to be within limitation with respect to all the instalments which had fallen due within 12 years of 21-4-1945, and ordered the execution to proceed with respect to HSECTION 3600. He disallowed the application for execution with respect to the instalments which were to fall due after the presentation of the application for execution. It may be mentioned here that in the operative portion of the order the words "within twelve years of the date of the application" seem to have been omitted by inadvertence, though it directs the execution to proceed with respect to ESECTION 3600 only.

6. It is against this order that this appeal has been filed.

7. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that, once the decree-holder elected to execute the entire decree, his right to execute the instalment decree ceased. Ho further pointed out that, when no application for execution of the instalment decree was instituted within three years of the passing of the decree, the present application for execution as an application for execution of the instalment decree was time barred. Lastly, he urged that, if this application be taken to be within limitation to recover the instalments, execution could lie only with respect to the instalments which had fallen due within three years of the presentation of this application for execution.

8. The order of the Court below appears to be correct. The contention that the mere presentation of an application for execution to recover the entire decretal amount would put an end to the instalment decree does not appeal to us. The argument really is that the decree-holder having, made his choice once, cannot be allowed to revoke that choice or be given benefit which he could have got only by revocation of his choice. It is said that he is bound by what he once elects. In, this connection reference has been made to a number of cases, but they do not appear to go so far as to lay down that a mere expression in an application for execution of a desire to, execute the entire decree by enforcing the default clause would bar the 'decree-holder from executing the-decree for the instalments only, treating the instalment decree as remaining alive.

9. The first case is Bhagwan Das v. Janki 23. ALL. 249. In this case the decree was for sale of mortgaged property and d