IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Agarwala and P. L. Bhargava, JJ.
MOHAMMAD KHAN - Appellant
Versus
MOHAMMAD SALIM KHAN - Respondents
Civil Revn. 654 Of 1948
Decided On : 08/23/1950
AGRICULTURISTS RELIEF ACT - SECTION 12 - REDEMPTION OF MORTGAGE - LIMITATION - ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF MORTGAGEE IN SUBSEQUENT MORTGAGE - WHETHER GIVES FRESH START FOR LIMITATION PERIOD - DEBT REDEMPTION ACT, SECTION 7 - INTERPRETATION - WHETHER DOES AWAY WITH LIMITATION PERIOD FOR REDEMPTION SUITS - COURT'S JURISDICTION TO REVIEW DECISIONS ON LIMITATION AND RES JUDICATA - DISCUSSION.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiff applied for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage executed in 1878. The mortgage was executed by Fateh Afzal Khan in favor of the defendants for a sum of Rs. 259. After Fateh Afzal Khan's death, his son Ashraf Khan executed another mortgage in 1900 for Rs. 167 in favor of the same mortgagees, reciting the existence of the previous mortgage. The plaintiff alleged that limitation for redemption was saved by the acknowledgment about the prior mortgage made in the second mortgage by Fateh Afzal Khan. The defense was that the suit was barred by limitation.
Finding of the Court:
The trial court held that the suit was not barred by limitation and decreed the suit for redemption without payment of any mortgage money. The lower appellate court held that the suit was barred by limitation and dismissed the application for redemption.
Issues: 1. Whether the suit for redemption of mortgage was barred by limitation? 2. Whether the acknowledgment of the mortgagee in the subsequent mortgage of 1900 gave a fresh start for the limitation period? 3. Whether Section 7 of the Debt Redemption Act does away with the limitation period for redemption suits?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the suit for redemption of mortgage was barred by limitation. The mortgage was executed in 1878 and the application for redemption was made in 1946, which was beyond the 60-year limitation period prescribed under Article 148 of the Limitation Act. 2. The court held that the acknowledgment of the mortgagee in the subsequent mortgage of 1900 did not give a fresh start for the limitation period. The acknowledgment must be by the person against whom the liability is sought to be enforced, which in this case was the mortgagee. The acknowledgment in the second mortgage was by the mortgagor, which could not give a fresh start for the limitation period. 3. The court held that Section 7 of the Debt Redemption Act does not do away with the limitation period for redemption suits. The intention of the legislature was to do away with a condition in a mortgage restraining redemption for a certain period or up to a certain date, and so the section provides that the mortgage may be redeemed at any time after the commencement of the Act. It does not do away with the period of limitation altogether.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the application for revision and upheld the decision of the lower appellate court.
( 1 ) THIS is an application in revision under Section 115, Civil P. C.
( 2 ) THE applicant applied under Section 12, U. P. Agriculturists Relief Act, for the redemption of a usufructuary mortgage, dated 1-8-1878, which was executed by Fateh Afzal Khan, grandfather of the plaintiff, in favour of the defendants opposite-parties for a sum of Rs. 259. After the death of Fateh Afzal Khan, his son, Ashraf Khan, executed another mortgage on 30-8-1900 for Rs. 167 in favour of the same mortgagees reciting the existence of the previous mortgage. The plaintiff alleged that limitation for redemption was saved by the acknowledgment about the prior mortgage made in the second mortgage by Fateh Afzal Khan. The defence inter alia was that the suit was barred by limitation.
( 3 ) THE trial Court held that the suit was not barred by limitation and that the entire amount has been paid-up by the usufruct of the property. It, therefore, decreed the suit for redemption without payment of any mortgage money. The lower appellate Court held that the suit was barred by limitation and without going into the merits of the case dismissed the application for redemption. Against this decree the applicant has come up in revision to this Court.
( 4 ) A preliminary objection has been raised by the opposite party that no revision lies against the decree of the Court below on the ground that no question of jurisdiction is involved in the case, and even if the decision of the Court below be wrong, it was an error of law and cannot be corrected in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court, and reference has been made in this connection to two cases of their Lordships of the Privy Council, namely, Amir Hasan khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh, 11 Cal. 6 : (11 I. A. 237 P. C.) and Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu religious Endowments Board, Madras, A. I. R. (36) 1949 P. C. 158 : (76 I. A. 67 ).
( 5 ) ON behalf of the applicant, reliance has been placed upon a recent decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Joy Chand Lal v. Kamalaksha Chaudhary, A. I. R. (36) 1949 P. C. 239 : (76 I. A. 131 ).
( 6 ) ON behalf of the opposite party, it has been contended that the decision in Joy Chand Lal babus case, (A. I. R. (36) 1949 P. C. 239 : 76 I. A. 131) is inconsistent with the decision of the privy Council in the case of Amir Hasan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh, 11 Cal. 6 : (11 I. A. 237 P. C.) and it has been urged that Amir Hasans case, 11 Cal. 6 : (11 I. A. 237 P. C.) related to a question of res judicata and in reference to that question their Lordships of the Judicial committee had held that it did not involve a question of jurisdiction, whereas in Joy Chand Lal babus case, A. I. R. (36) 1949 P. C. 239 : (76 I. A. 131) their Lordships definitely ruled that a decision on a question of Limitatation or res judicata involved a question of jurisdiction.
( 7 ) THE facts in Amir Hasan Khans case, 11 Cal. 6: (11 I. A. 237 P. C.) were these: A suit was commenced in the Court of the Extra Assistant Commissioner having jurisdiction under Act xxxii [32] of 1871 in the Sitapur district of Oudh. Amir Hasan Khan sued Sheo Baksh Singh to obtain possession by redemption of a mortgage of a certain property. The property was mortgaged in 1849 by 8 cosharers and the right to redeem had been contested prior to the suit both in the settlement and in the civil Courts. The defence to the suit was that it was barred under section 13 (present Section 11 Civil P. C.) and Section 43 (present C. A Rule 2, Civil P. C.) of act X [10] of 1877 and further that the plaintiff had no title to claim redemption of the mortgaged property. The suit was decreed by the Extra Assistant Commissioner and this decree was confirmed by the District Judge of Sitapur. A petition was, however, presented to the judicial Commissioner under Section 622 (corresponding to Section 115 of the present Civil P. C.) of Act X [10] of 1877, as amended by Section 92 of Act XII [12] of 1879, alleging that the fi
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