Hon’ble Amitava Lala, J.—This appeal is arising out of the judgment and award dated 23rd November, 2006 passed by the learned Judge, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 676 of 2004.

2. Right to appeal of an aggrieved from the order of the tribunal is available under Section 173 of the Act. The dispute in respect of the claim of compensation was contested between the claimants and the owner of the vehicle and ultimately the award was passed in favour of the claimants to be paid by the appellant insurance company on behalf of the owner.

3. In the court below an application was filed by the appellant/insurance company herein, under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter called as the ‘Act’) taking a plea that the owner of the vehicle is in collusion with the claimants, which was dismissed on 15th November, 2006 having no materials. No appeal nor any other proceeding challenging such order was made by the appellant herein. But appeal is preferred from the award. As and when it was pointed out by this Court, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant wanted leave to incorporate the date of the order in the memorandum of appeal, when the Court was pleased to grant permission only for the sake of formality. However, even thereafter a wrong date of the order being 25th November, 2006 has been incorporated in the place and instead of 15th November, 2006. In any event, let us construe that the appeal has been made from both the award dated 23rd November, 2006 and the earlier order dated 15th November, 2006 passed by the learned Judge, to avoid hypertechnicality alone.

4. Now let us consider whether appeal on behalf of Insurance Company is maintainable or not. Since an interesting question cropped up and since the contesting parties are agreeable in the hearing of the appeal on the informal papers having involvement of the question of law, we have called upon them to proceed with the appeal. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondents contended that the case of the appellant is squarely covered by the various recent judgments.

5. According to us, the scope and ambit of preferring an appeal by the insurance company from an order of rejection passed by the court below under Section 170 of the Act is very limited because an insurance company is an agent of the insured i.e. principal, the owner of the vehicle. It has no independent locus standi. An agent will be abide by the contractual obligations between it and its principal. He has no separate entity unless and until the relevant statute is permitting such agent to proceed before the court of law independently. According to law, if it satisfies the Court about accrual of its independent right under Section 149 (2) of the Act, then only right of appeal exists but not otherwise. Relevant part of the Section is quoted hereunder :

“(2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment or award unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment or award is given the insurer had notice through the Court or, as the case may be, the Claims Tribunal of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of such judgment or award so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely:—

(a) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions namely:—

(i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle—

(a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or

(b) for organised racing and speed testing, or

(c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or

(d) without side-car being attached