K. N. SRIVASTAVA, J. :- The following three questions have been referred to us :-

1. Whether a relief for declaration that a property is endowed property so as to bind strangers to the trust can be granted in a suit under Section 92 of the C. P. Code?

2. Whether the plaintiffs in a suit under Section 92 of the C. P. Code, can claim reliefs, which do not find a mention in the permission or sanction granted by the Advocate-General under Section 92 of the C. P. Code, and

3. Whether clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 92 of the C. P. Code contemplates only vesting a title in the property in a trustee?

2. We propose to answer these questions in seriatim. Question no. 1 really consists of two questions, one as to whether a declaratory decree can be passed in a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and whether in such a suit a stranger can be made a party. One would have thought that the curtain on this controversy had fallen after the decisions of the Privy Council in the case of Abdur Rahim v. Abu Mahomed Barkat Ali (AIR 1928 PC 16) and of the Supreme Court in the case of Pragdasji v. Ishwarlalbhai, (AIR 1952 SC 143) and in the case of Bishwanath v. Sri Thakur Radha Ballabhji (AIR 1967 SC 1044), but counsel for the respondents has by reference to a large number of cases including some of this Court made a futile attempt to establish that this is not so. It is as such necessary to examine the various decisions on this point.

3. In AIR 1928 PC 16 (supra), a suit under Section 92, C.P.C. by some Mohammadans was filed against Rukia Bibi as defendant, for removal of Rukia Bibi from the office of Mutawalli, for account and for settling a scheme for the management of the said properties. Sanction for this suit and these reliefs had already been obtained from the Advocate-General. The plaint of the suit was subsequently amended by addition of certain persons who were strangers and were claiming the property as their personal property, and by addition of a prayer for declaration that the property in suit was waqf property and not the personal property of the defendants. No sanction of the Advocate-General was obtained for this amendment. A compromise application was filed to which one of the plaintiffs was not a party and a compromise decree was thereafter drawn up. By this compromise, a portion of the disputed land was declared as waqf property and the rest as secular property of the newly added defendants. These newly added defendants thereafter alienated the property, and another suit was filed by five Mohammadans against the newly added defendants of the first suit and their alienees. In this suit, it was prayed that the alienated land be declared as waqf property, and the defendants be restrained from obtaining possession or realising rent and for a declaration that the compromise decree was not binding on the plaintiffs. When the matter went up before the Privy Council, it was contended that the second suit could not have been filed without obtaining the sanction of the Advocate-General. It is necessary to notice at this stage that the reliefs in the second suit were mostly declaratory in nature, and one for an injunction. Their Lordships of the Privy Council rejected this contention, and held that the reliefs prayed for in the second suit were outside the scope of a suit under Section 92, C.P.C., and that Section 92 applied only to those suits in which the reliefs specified in Section 92 (1), C. P. C. were claimed. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court had occasion to consider this case in the case of AIR 1952 SC 143 (supra) and approved this view of the Privy Council, and held that a suit for declaration that certain property appertains to a religious trust may be filed under the general law, but was outside the scope of Section 92, C. P. C. In Abdul Rahim' case AIR 1928 PC 16 (supra) their Lordships of the Privy Council also considered the question as to whether relief against third parties or strangers coul