Allahbad High Court
G.C.MATHUR,A.K.KIRTY,R.B.MISRA
Gobardhan Singh - Appellant
Versus
Barsati - Respondent
Decided On : 12/16/1971
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE - SECTION 148 - EXTENSION OF TIME - POWER OF COURT - PEREMPTORY ORDER - EFFECT - COURT'S JURISDICTION TO EXTEND TIME - APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME - WHEN CAN BE MADE - SUFFICIENCY OF CAUSE - INTERPRETATION OF SUPREME COURT DECISION IN MAHANTH RAM DAS V. GANGA DAS, AIR 1961 SC 882.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff's suit was dismissed for default and was restored on the condition that he paid Rs.8/- for costs to the defendant on or before a specified date. In case of default, the application was to stand dismissed. The plaintiff paid a part of the amount before the due date but failed to pay the balance. He applied for permission to pay the balance and for a direction to the defendant to receive it, but the application was dismissed. The plaintiff then filed an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was also rejected. The plaintiff challenged the order of dismissal in revision.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the Munsif erred in dismissing the application for extension of time solely on the ground that there was a peremptory order providing that the application shall stand rejected in case the amounts were not paid by the specified date and that the application for extension of time was made after the time had expired. The court held that the Munsif had jurisdiction under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure to enlarge the time even when the application for extension of time was made after the expiry of the time fixed.
Issues: 1. Whether the Munsif had the power to extend the time for payment of costs even after the expiry of the time fixed in the order. 2. Whether the peremptory nature of the order took away the power and jurisdiction of the Court to extend the time in appropriate cases.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the Munsif had the power to extend the time for payment of costs even after the expiry of the time fixed in the order. The court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das, AIR 1961 SC 882, which held that the Court has power under Section 148, Civil P.C. to extend the time for doing an act even after the time given has expired; a peremptory order providing for the automatic dismissal of the application or appeal or suit on failure to do the act within the time fixed does not take away the power and jurisdiction of the Court to extend the time in appropriate cases; such peremptory orders are made "n terrorem" in order that dilatory litigants might avoid negligence and delay. 2. The court held that the peremptory nature of the order did not take away the power and jurisdiction of the Court to extend the time in appropriate cases. The court observed that such peremptory orders are made "n terrorem" in order that dilatory litigants might avoid negligence and delay.
Final Decision: The court allowed the revision with costs. The application for extension of time was allowed and the amount of costs was deemed to have been deposited within the extended time. The order of the Munsif consigning the records was set aside. The order dated December 7, 1968, allowing the application for restoration of the plaint was to stand. The Munsif was directed to proceed with the suit in accordance with law.
G. C. MATHUR, J. :- This revision has been referred to this Bench for consideration of the question whether the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Gaya Din v. Lalta Prasad, AIR 1936 All 477 is still good law. Doubts have been cast on the correctness of this decision on account of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das, AIR 1961 SC 882.
2. Since the entire revision has been referred for decision, it is necessary to set out the relevant facts. The suit, out of which this revision arises, was filed on July 4, 1966, by the applicant in the court of the Munsif, Mirzapur. Some amendments in the plaint were allowed by the Munsif by his order dated April 11, 1967. Consequent to these amendments, there was a deficiency in the court-fees by Rs.249.50 as reported by the Munsarim on August 4, 1967. The deficiency in court-fees was not made good within the time allowed and on October 4, 1967, the plaint was rejected as insufficiently stamped. On October 19, 1967, the applicant made an application for restoration and on December 7, 1968, the application was allowed. The operative portion of the order of the Munsif reads:
"I allow the application and restore the plaint on payment of Rs.6/- as costs and payment of entire court-fee by 11-12-1968. In case of any default, the application shall stand rejected."
It appears that the matter was put up before the Munsif on December 11, 1968, on which date he passed an order for consigning the record. From the record of the case it appears that the deficiency in court-fees was made good on December 11, 1968, possibly, after the order consigning the record had been made. The amount of Rs.6/-, which had been ordered to be paid as costs, was actually deposited by tender in the court on December 12, 1968. When the applicant came to know of the order about consigning the record, he made an application on December 17, 1968, under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying that the order of December 11, 1968, consigning the record be set aside and the suit be proceeded with. This application was treated as an application for extension of time. This application was rejected by the Munsif on Sept. 2, 1969, on the ground that, since the earlier application for restoration stood rejected on December 11, 1968, the court had no power either to extend the period or to pass any further order restoring the plaint. The Munsif relied upon the decision of this Court in AIR 1936 All 477 (supra). It may here be mentioned that, though this order states that the applicant did not pay the necessary court-fees on December 11, 1968, there is no dispute that the court-fees had in fact been paid on that date. It is this order of the Munsif which is challenged in this revision.
3. The question, which arises in the case, is whether the Munsif could, after the expiry of the period for paying costs, extend time therefor. As already stated above, the Munsif, in holding that he could not extend the time, followed the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in AIR 1936 All 477 (supra). It is contended by learned counsel for the applicant that this decision is no longer good law as the Supreme Court has, in Mahanth Ram Das's case, AIR 1961 SC 882 taken a contrary view.
4. In Gaya Din's case, AIR 1936 All 477 the suit, which had been dismissed for default, was restored on the application of the plaintiff on the condition that he paid Rs.8/- for costs to the defendant on or before 27-10-1934. In case of default, the application was to stand dismissed. Rs.4/- were paid on 15-9-1934 but the balance was not paid upto 27-10-1934. On 29-10-1934 the plaintiff made an application for permission to pay the balance and for a direction to the defendant to receive it. The Munsif dismissed the application on the ground that he had no power to extend the time. In the revision before this Court, the plaintiff contended that the time should have been extended under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Pro
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