GANGESHWAR PRASAD, J. :- The following question has been referred to this Division Bench for answer:

"Can the propriety of an order of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act admitting an application under section 15 (2) after the expiry of the prescribed period of six months be raised in an appeal by an employer against a direction under section 15 (3) of the Act."

2. The question arose in two connected civil revisions which came up for hearing before Mathur, J. The learned Judge did not note any conflict in decisions relating directly to the question, but he found a conflict in decisions on a matter having a vital bearing on it, and he thought it necessary that the conflict be resolved. He accordingly directed that the papers be laid before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for referring the question to a larger Bench. That is how the question has been referred to this Bench.

3. In his order for reference Mathur, J. mentioned two cases arising under the Payment of Wages Act: Prem Narayan Amritlal Verma v. The Divisional Traffic Manager AIR 1954 Bom 78 decided by Chagla, C. J. and Civil Revn. No. 603 of 1961 of this Court decided by Manchamia, J. In the former case it was held that the order of the Authority condoning delay in the making of an application under section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act could not be challenged in appeal against a direction made under section 15 (3) of the Act. The latter case dealt with a situation in which the Authority had found that the application made under section 15 (2) of the Act was within time and it was held by Manchanda, J. that the application having been found to be within lime and in any event the delay in making the application having been condoned the order passed by the Authority in this respect could not be the subject matter of an appeal or be questioned in an appeal under section 17 of the Act. The view taken in these cases on the question under reference was, therefore, the same.

After mentioning these cases, however, Mathur, J. proceeded to observe that it was settled law that the delay in making an application under section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act could be condoned only on grounds similar to those contemplated by section 5 of the Limitation Act and that led to the consideration of the question whether the condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act could be challenged in second appeal against the decree passed in the first appeal, and since there was a conflict in decisions on the aforesaid question and on similar questions arising under other statutory provisions analogous to section 5 of the Limitation Act the conflict should be resolved. Obviously, the learned Judge was of the opinion that resolution of this conflict was necessary for answering the question under reference. We may, with respect, mention that in Sheo Prasad v. Addl. District Judge Moradabad AIR 1962 All 144 Oak, J. expressed disagreement with the view of Chagla, C. J. in AIR 1954 Bom 78 (Supra) and held that it is open to the appellate authority to enter into the question whether the Claim Commissioner was justified in condoning the delay under section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act. It is evident that this view is also opposed to the view taken by Manchanda, J. in the aforesaid civil revision of this Court. There is thus a conflict even in decisions relating directly to the question under reference. It appears that AIR 1962 All 144 (Supra) was not cited before Mathur, J., even as it was not cited before us.

4. The relevant provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, are as follows :

"Section 15 (1) ......

(2) Where contrary to the provisions of this Act any deduction has been made from the wages of an employed person, or any payment of wages has been delayed, such person himself, or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector under this Act, or any othe