DESAI, C.J. : This is an appeal from a judgment of Misra, J. dismissing the appellant's petition for certiorari for the quashing of an order passed by an Additional Sub-Divisional Officer setting aside under S. 12-C of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 read with R. 25 of the Panchayat Raj Rules the election of the appellant to the office of Pradhan of a Gaon Sabha. This special appeal came up for hearing before two of us who referred it to a larger bench because of certain questions of importance involved in it.

2. The appellant was convicted on 27-7-62 under S. 16 read with S. 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and fined Rs. 100/-. He had been found guilty of mixing a prohibited colour in sweets sold to a customer. Subsequently he, Naumi Lal respondent No. 2 and two others, who are respondents 3 and 4 contested election for the office of Pradhan of a Gaon Sabha and the appellant was declared elected as Pradhan. Naumi Lal filed a petition under S. 12-C of the Panchayat Raj Act questioning the election on the ground that the appellant was disqualified for being chosen or nominated or for holding any office in a Gaon Sabha on account of his being convicted under S. 16 read with S. 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act on 27-7-62. Under S. 5-A of the Act a person is disqualified for being chosen or nominated or for holding any office in a Gaon Sabha if he

"(h) has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude."

The contention of the respondent was that the offence of S. 16 read with S. 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is an offence involving moral turpitude and that the appellant's nomination was improperly accepted because he was disqualified for being chosen or nominated or for holding any office in a Gaon Sabha. Under S. 12-C the election of a person as Pradhan of a Gaon Sabha can be called in question on the ground that the result of the election has been materially affected by the improper acceptance of any nomination. The Additional Sub-Divisional Officer accepted the contentions of the respondent and held that the offence of S. 16 read with S. 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is an offence involving moral turpitude, that the appellant was consequently disqualified for being nominated and for holding any office in a Gaon Sabha, that his nomination was, therefore, improperly accepted and that the result of the election was affected by the improper acceptance. He allowed the respondent's petition and set aside the appellant's election and directed the District Magistrate to take steps to fill up the vacancy of Pradhan in the Gaon Sabha.

3. The appellant applied for certiorari for the quashing of the Additional Sub-Divisional Officer's order on the ground that the offence of S. 16 read with S. 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is not an offence involving moral turpitude. Our brother Misra did not agree and refused certiorari.

4. When a person is convicted he is convicted for doing an act (or acts) which amounts to an offence which is punishable under a statutory provision. The provision describes the offence for which a person can be convicted and if an act done by a person comes within the ambit of it he is convicted of it. In deciding whether a person is convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude there are two ways of looking at the matter, one of considering the nature of the act done and the other of considering the nature of the offence punished under the statutory provision, S. 5-A speaks of"an offence involving moral turpitude" and suggests that what is to be seen is the nature of the offence which is made punishable by the statutory provision and not that of the act which is brought within its ambit. It must be the offence, i.e. the ingredients of the offence prescribed by the statutory provision, and not the act actually done, which must involve moral turpitude. The stress is on the abstract, not on the concrete facts. The ingredients prescribed by