PATHAK, J. :- The question before this Bench for its opinion is :

"When the State Government deals with a proceeding under S. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act under S. 7-F of the same Act, does the State Government act administratively or in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity ?"

2. The petitioner is in occupation of a portion of a house, No. 7/152, Swarup Nagar, Kanpur as the tenant of the fourth respondent, Mrs. Kalindvi Mitter, who is the owner of that house. Mrs. Mitter applied under S. 3(1) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur, for permission to sue the petitioner for her eviction. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer granted permission. The petitioner applied in revision to the Commissioner, Allahabad but the latter upheld the grant of permission. Then the petitioner applied to the State Government. On June 27, 1961, the State Government,, acting under S. 7-F, considered the application and revoked the permission granted to Mrs. Mitter. It appears that subsequently, upon a review application by Mrs. Mitter, the matter was considered by the State Government, and by its order of October 12, 1961, Mrs. Mitter was permitted to file a suit for the eviction.

3. The petitioner moved this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the jurisdiction of the State Government to make the order of October 12, 1961, the challenge being founded principally on the ground that having once passed the order of June 27, 1961, there was no power in the State Government to reconsider it and to pass a different order. The petition came on for hearing before our brother Oak and he, being of the opinion that the earlier decisions of this Court on the nature of the powers of the State Government under S.7-F required further consideration, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar v. State o£ Bombay, AIR 1964 SC 436 and of our brother Dhavan in Ram Chand v. Bhagwan Das, 1963 All LJ 752 referred the aforesaid question to a larger Bench for its opinion. The case was that listed before a Bench of our brothers Gupta and Tripathi, and they directed that the question should be considered by a Full Bench.

4. Judicial tribunals, it is now commonly recognised, may exercise both, judicial and administrative powers. So also administrative bodies may enjoy not only administrative but also quasi-judicial powers. Whether a proceeding on an order is quasi-judicial or administrative must be determined by reference to the nature of the functions discharged. It is of no great moment that the proceeding has been taken or the order made by an administrative tribunal or a judicial body. In drawing the line between administrative orders and judicial or quasi-judicial orders, it has been observed :

"Administrative law is concerned with the and control of the powers of administrative authorities, with emphasis on function rather than structures."*

*H.W.R. Wada, Administrative Law, Edn. 1961, P.2.

5. The problem is one of nature of the function. How then, is this problem to be approached ? In his celebrated article on "Administrative Tribunals and the Control" (1933) 49 LQR 94, 419 Mr. D.M. Gordon, Q.C., pointed out that judicial functions involve the decision of rights

and liabilities, so that an investigation is a material part of the functions, whereas non-judicial functions may be either ministerial duties or administrative powers. Ministerial duties, he observes, are exercised by taking active, often coercive measures, and administrative powers by meting out policy and expediency, with an unfettered discretion; a judicial body administers justice through the agency of, and in accordance with, legal evidence. When a body is acting administratively it has no power to consult its own wishes. When it is acting administratively its standards are subjective and it follows its own wishes. But when it is acting judicially it professes