2011 Supreme(All) 389
[2011(3) ADJ 84 (FB)]
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
(Full Bench)
BEFORE : F. I. REBELLO, C.J., V. K. SHUKLA AND A.P. SAHI, JJ.
VINAYENDRA NATH UPADHYAY AND OTHERS ….Petitioners
Versus
STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS ….Respondents
(Civil Misc. Writ Petition Nos. 51979, 51985, 51986, 51987, 51990, 51991, 51992 and 51995 of 2005, decided on 11th February, 2011)
Counsel :
Navin Sinha and R.C.Singh for the Petitioners; M.C. Chaturvedi, C.S.C. and Dr. Y.K. Srivastava, S.C. for the Respondents.
Headnote:(A) U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973—Section 39—(Indian) Stamp Act, 1899—Section 2(16)—Stamp duty—Additional stamp duty—Levy of—Lease executed for the right to collect toll on a bridge—Held, an instrument of lease executed for the right to collect toll on a bridge executed would amount to an instrument conveying or transferring immovable property subject to imposition of Additional stamp duty. [Paras 30, 31 and 32]
(B) U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973—Section 39—(Indian) Stamp Act, 1899—Section 2(16)—The word "immovable property"—Meaning of—Held, the word "immovable property" incorporated in Section 39 of the Act carry the same meaning and connotation as assigned to them in Section 2(16) of the Stamp Act, while defining the term lease and includes within its fold any instrument by which tolls of any description are let. [Paras 26 to 32]
(C) Interpretation of statute—If a statute is sought to be applied by creating a fiction, then such a fiction has to be given full effect to by the Court. [Para 24]
By the Court.—This reference raises issues involving the power of the State to impose and realise Additional Stamp Duty on an instrument of lease executed for a contract to realise toll in respect of two bridges in the district of Allahabad over the river Ganges, namely Lal Bahadur Shastri Bridge and Chandra Shekhar Azad Bridge. The imposition of this Additional Stamp Duty is under the provisions of Section 39 (1) of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1972 read with the Indian Stamp Act 1899.
2. The petitioners in all the writ petitions have assailed the orders of the Addl. Collector (Finance & Revenue), Allahabad, under Section 31 of the 1899 Act as also the revisional orders passed by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority under Section 56 (2) of the Act, upholding the said imposition.
3. A learned single Judge of this Court, while proceeding to hear the writ petitions, took notice of a Division Bench judgment of this Court relied upon by the petitioners in the case of M/s Bilal Ahmad Sherwani and Kishori Lal v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1992 All 181, and upon a request made by the learned Standing Counsel for reconsideration of the said judgment, came to the conclusion that the Division Bench appears to have not been apprised of the issue whether a toll is a benefit arising out of land and, therefore, immovable property. The learned single Judge was of the opinion that the contention advanced by the learned Standing Counsel requires a consideration in view of the observations made in the referring order dated 7.2.2006 and accordingly a request was made to Hon’ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench as the learned single Judge found himself to be bound by the decision of the Division Bench aforesaid.
4. The matter was placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice, who vide order dated 31.3.2006, constituted a larger Bench of three Hon’ble Judges presided over by Hon’ble the Chief Justice to hear the matter. Accordingly, the reference has been placed before us for answering the doubt expressed by the learned single Judge and for an authoritative pronouncement on the issues raised.
5. Before embarking upon the matter any further, we may clarify that even though the questions to be answered have not been formally framed by the learned single Judge, yet in order to analyse the issue, we propose to frame the questions and answer them accordingly. Upon analysis of the pleadings and the gist of the order of reference dated 7.2.2006 of the learned single Judge, the following questions, to our mind, arise that need to be answered :
(1) Whether an instrument of lease executed for the right to collect toll on a bridge executed would amount to an instrument conveying or transferring immovable property subject to imposition of Additional Stamp Duty as defined under Section 39 of the U.P. Urban Planning & Development Act, 1973?
(2) Whether the words “immovable property” incorporated in Section 39 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 carry the same meaning and connotation as assigned to them in Section 2 (16) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 while defining the term “lease” thereunder and consequently includes within its fold any instrument by which tolls of any description are let?
(3) Whether the decision of the Division Bench in the case of M/s Bilal Ahmad Sherwani and Kishori Lal v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1992 All 181, does not lay down the law correctly and requires any re-consideration as referred to by the learned single Judge?
6. Learned counsels Sri Navin Sinha Senior Advocate on behalf of the petitioners assisted by Sri R.C. Singh and Sri M.C. Chaturvedi learned Chief Standing Counsel for the State have been heard. They have advanced their submissions, the petitioners contending that no such additional Stamp Duty is leviable and the respondent State supporting the said levy. There are however certain undisputed areas which need be mentioned at the very outset.
7. The covenant, on