The main legal point established in the judgment is that previous attempts to acquire a property do not necessarily make a subsequent acquisition mala fide. Additionally, the judgment clarified the definition of public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act and the time limit for making a declaration under section 6 of the Act.

H. L. GOKHALE, C. J.

Heard Mr. Deepak Seth, learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. Syeed Hussain, learned Additional Advocate General appears for the State-respondents. Sri Mohd. Arif Khan, appears for intervener.

2. The petitioner claims to be a co-operative housing society formed by some 50 members, who are employees of the income tax department. The peti tioner claims to have purchased a property known as Rasulpur House and land adjoining thereto bearing old House No. 1-C, Mahanagar, and new No. 545/1, Mahanagar at Lucknow, recorded at Khasra No. 261, in a public action made by the Tax Recovery Officer of the income tax department. It has purchased the property to put up its housing society over there. The sale is stated to have been confirmed by the auctioning authority and the sale certificate is issued

on 28. 3. 1979 in favour of the society and the sale is duly registered with the Sub-Registrar, Lucknow on 22. 5. 1979.

3. The respondent No. 4-Deputy Director (Animal Husbandry) of State of U. P. is stated to be the tenant of this property, which is of the area of 5 bighas and 15 biswas. He is having an office and workshop over there and State wants to expand it. The first respondent-State U. P. has issued notifications to acquire this property under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Notification under section 4 of the Act was issued on 27. 12. 1986 and one under section 6 on 17. 2. 1988. The pe tition seeks to challenged these two notifications. The petition has been op posed by filing a counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondents. A rejoinder and further pleadings are also filed.

4. The principal challenge in the writ petition is two folds. The first is that the acquisition is vitiated by mala fides and the second is that the notifi cation under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act has lapsed for the reason that the declaration under section 6 of the said Act has not been made within one year from the date of publication of section 4 notification.

5. As far as the first submission is concerned, it is on three different foot ing. Firstly, it is stated that the proceedings for acquisition were initiated twice in the past and were subsequently dropped. Thus, it is pointed out that first attempt to acquire this property was made in the year 1983. A letter dated 26. 7. 1983 is annexed at Annexure-6 to the writ petition, which is a communica tion of the Land Acquisition Officer, Lucknow informing the then Secretary of the petitioner-society that the acquisition proceedings then initiated had been dropped. The second attempt to acquire the very property was made when a no tification under section 4 of the Act was issued on 17. 1. 1985. The same was ob jected by the petitioner-society by filing its objection on 12. 91985. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the proceeding is deemed to be dropped since no declaration was subsequently made under section 6 of the Act.

6. This submission was countered on behalf of the respondents by submit ting that merely because attempts were made earlier to acquire the property twice, it does not make the subsequent acquisition mala fide, nor can the princi ple of res judicata be invoked with respect to the acquisition proceedings. In our view, the submission is well taken and no inference of mala fides can be drawn on any such counts. Merely because attempts were made earlier in this behalf on two occasions and the proceedings were dropped, it cannot make the third at tempt a mala fide act.

7. The second limb of argument of mala fide is that the petitioner had filed a suit to evict the respondent No. 4 from the suit property, being Suit No. 63 of 1983. Prior thereto, a notice to quit was given on 11. 5. 1982 by invoking the provision of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court by a speaking order. It is submitted on behalf of the peti tioner that the respondents-State got the suit dismissed by making a false statement for the State had

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