The judgment emphasizes the jurisdiction of civil courts to grant interim injunctions, the binding nature of civil court findings on criminal courts, and the need for redressal of title issues through the civil court.

( 1 ) THIS writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 5. 6. 2005 (Annexure-18) passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Gyanpur, Sant Ravidas Nagar, holding an enquiry and till then to maintain status quo regarding possession, over the property in dispute.

( 2 ) THE facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the petitioner on the one hand and the respondents No. 4 and 5 on the other, have a dispute in respect of a particular piece of land. The petitioner claims that she had been granted a patta in respect of the said land under the scheme of Family Planning and she is in possession thereof. Respondents No. 4 and 5 claim ownership over the said land and filed a Civil Suit No. 525 of 2004 for permanent injunction against the present petitioner. However, their application for interim relief under Order XXXIX, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called the c. P. C. ) is still pending and no order has yet been passed. The respondents No. 4 and 5 approached the Sub-Divisional magistrate, Gyanpur and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate has passed the order dated 5. 6. 2005 that the parties shell maintain status quo. Hence, the present petition.

( 3 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the order passed by the Sub-Divisional magistrate is without jurisdiction and nullity. No order could be passed by him as no interim order has yet been passed in favour of the said plaintiff-respondents. Thus, the petition deserves to be allowed and the order dated 5. 6. 2005 is liable to be quashed.

( 4 ) LEARNED standing counsel has submitted that the civil suit is still pending wherein the present petitioner is the defendant and in case the respondents No. 4 and 5 herein could not succeed in getting an interim injunction, there is no bar in law for the present petitioner to file an application for interim relief before the said Court. Even otherwise, if she apprehends any threat to her property, she may maintain an independent suit. More so, the order passed by the sub-Divisional Magistrate is in order to maintain the law and order situation, as is evident from the language of the order itself and once the civil court passes an order, the order passed by the sub-Divisional Magistrate will stand superseded. Thus, the petition should not be entertained.

( 5 ) WE have considered the rival submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.

( 6 ) THE petitioner herself claims to be in possession of the land. The order impugned also provides for maintaining the status quo. We fail to understand how the order impugned is adversely affecting the petitioner and what grievance she can have. More so, if petitioner feels any kind of apprehension, there is no bar in law for her to file a separate and independent suit against the said respondents or to apply for interim relief in the said suit and once she succeeds in getting the interim relief from the civil court, either by moving an application in the same suit or by filing an independent suit, the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate will stand superseded. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the civil court can grant an interim relief even if the case does not fall within the ambit of Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, c. P. C.

( 7 ) THE Honble Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Raj Bahadur Rai Raja Seth Hira Lal, AIR1962 SC 527 , [1962 ]supp1 SCR450 , held that the civil court has a power to grant interim injunction in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction even if the case does not fall within the ambit of provisions of Order XXXIX, C. P. C. while delivering the judgment the honble Apex Court considered the scope of application of the provisions of Section 94, C. P. C. and observed as under : it is well-settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, for the simple reason that the legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in futur