The main legal point established in the judgment is that the High Court's power is limited after the disposal of the writ petition, and the Chief Justice has the prerogative to distribute business of the High Court. Additionally, the court emphasized that contempt jurisdiction is an independent jurisdiction of original nature, and for exercising the jurisdiction under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, the procedure prescribed by law has to be followed.

S. K. Sen, C.J.—We have heard Sri B. P. Singh holding brief of Sri Amit Bose, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri S. M. K. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner, (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner).

2. This special appeal is directed against an order passed by the learned single Judge directing the appellant to appear in person and to explain why the orders passed in the writ petition by the learned single Judge have not been carried out.

3. Short facts are that the petitioner filed a writ petition claiming appointment on compassionate ground under the Dying-in-Harness Rules and he was granted relief in the writ petition.

4. The contention of the respondents-State Government in the application, which has been filed by the petitioner, is two fold, firstly the writ petitioner’s father was only a work charge employee and secondly there was a ban imposed by the State Government in making appointment on daily wages or in work charge establishment.

5. The question that arises for consideration in this special appeal is whether after the writ petition is finally disposed of, further orders can be passed on a miscellaneous application.

6. It is well-settled that after the disposal of the writ petition, only an application for review or clarification can be made but no further relief can be prayed for. In this connection, we take note of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U. P. v. Brahma Datt Sharma and another, 1987 (1) AWC 760 (SC) : 1987 (2) SCC 179, wherein, inter alia, it was held in paragraph 10 of the judgment as follows :

“The High Court’s order is not sustainable for yet another reason. Respondents’ writ petition challenging the order of dismissal had been finally disposed of on August 10, 1984, thereafter nothing remained pending before the High Court. No miscellaneous application could be filed in the writ petition to revive proceedings in respect of subsequent events after two years. If the respondent is aggrieved by the notice dated January 29, 1986, he could have filed a separate petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the notice as it provided as separate cause of action to him. The respondent was not entitled to assail validity of the notice before the High Court by means of a miscellaneous application in the writ petition which had already been decided. The High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application as no proceedings were pending before it. The High Court committed error in entertaining the respondent’s application which was founded on a separate cause of action. When proceedings stand terminated by final disposal of writ petition it is not open to the Court to reopen the proceedings by means of a miscellaneous application in respect of a matter which provided a fresh cause of action. If this principle is not followed there would be confusion and chaos and the finality of proceedings would cease to have any meaning.”

7. Mr. S. M. K. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1-writ petitioner placed reliance upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Jitendra Pal v. Committee of Management and others, 1992 (3) AWC 1685 : 1993 (1) UPLBEC 218, wherein it was held that power of the High Court under writ jurisdiction is not confined till disposal of the writ petition but High Court can pass appropriate orders even after its disposal. While making said finding, the Division Bench relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, Dwarka Nath v. I.T.O., AIR 1966 SC 81 and M. V. Elizabeth v. Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd., 1992 (2) JT 65.

8. The Division Bench also quoted the relevant portion of the judgment given in M. V. Elizabeth v. Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd. (supra) which is as follows :

“The High Courts in India are superior courts of record. They have original and appellate jurisdiction. They have inherent and plenary powers. Unless expre