2004 (3) AWC 2414
(ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT)
Tarun Chatterjee, C.J. and Ashok Bhushan, J.
Special Appeal No. 553 of 2003
Decided on March 19, 2004
Smt. Subhawati Devi
Versus
R. K. Singh and another
The court considered the maintainability of an appeal under Section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act against an order rejecting a contempt application and discharging the contempt notice. The court extensively analyzed the interpretation of the expression 'exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt' and referred to various Supreme Court decisions to conclude that an appeal lies not only against an order imposing punishment but also from an order or direction made by the Court in the exercise of its contempt jurisdiction. The court held that in the present case, since the contempt application was rejected and the notice of contempt was discharged, no appeal was maintainable under Section 19 (1) of the Act.
Tarun Chatterjee, C.J.—This is a special appeal filed under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) read with Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order dated 11th September, 2003 passed by a learned Judge of this Court in its contempt jurisdiction.
2. A preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the respondents that in view of Section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), which is a complete code, no appeal could be held to be maintainable under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent read with Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules.
3. Before we take up this question for consideration, it would be fit and proper that we must decide whether a contempt appeal under Section 19 (1) of the Act is maintainable in law. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, an appeal under Section 19 (1) of the Act shall not lie against an order passed in a proceeding for contempt
except against any order of punishment imposed upon a contemnor in terms of Section 12 of the Act or in other words it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the expression contained in Section 19 (1) of the Act, namely “from any order or decision of a High Court in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt of Court” would only relate to those orders in respect of which certain orders have been passed for violation of the orders of the Court and not otherwise.
4. Before we take up the preliminary objection for consideration it would be fit and proper for us to state the nature of the order passed by the learned Judge in the contempt application, which is under challenge in this appeal. The material portion of the impugned order runs as under :
“It appears that the applicant who was allegedly employed with the opposite parties sought regularisation of her services and with that end she preferred a writ petition. This petition was disposed of by the aforesaid order at the admission stage itself without inviting any counter-affidavit. By order dated 8.1.1998, it was directed that the respondent No. 1 shall pass appropriate orders in the light of the decision rendered in the case of Ram Pal v. Joint Director of Ayogik Prayog Evam Prashikshan Kendra, Basti, decided on 22.9.1997 in Writ Petition No. 9821 of 1994. After issuance of notices affidavits have been filed by both the parties.
Having perused the affidavits filed on behalf of the parties, I do not find that this is a case of wilful or deliberate violation of the orders of this Court. Notices are discharged. Petition is rejected. Consigned to records.”
5. From a perusal of the impugned order, as noted herein above, it is evident that the impugned order does not indicate any imposition of punishment contemplated by Section 12 of the Act, but it can be deduced from reading of the order passed on the contempt petition that the impugned order decided some disputes raised by the appellant seeking to hold that it was a case of wilful and deliberate violation of the orders of the Court. At this stage and before proceeding further, we feel it necessary to reproduce the relevant provisions of the Act, which are material for the purpose of deciding this appeal. Under the definition clause of the Act, “contempt of courts” means civil contempt or criminal contempt, which is indicated in Section 2 (a) of the Act. Section 2 (b) of the Act defines “civil contempt” which means wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court. Section 19 of the Act makes a provision for filing an appeal against an order or decision of the Court, which runs as under :
“19. Appeals.—(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt :
(a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge to a Bench of not less than t
1998 (3) AWC 2264 (Paras 23 and 38)
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