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1974 Supreme(All) 53

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
K. B. SRIVASTAVA, ONKAR SINGH, JJ.
DR. JANARDAN PRASAD GUPTA
VERSUS
DR. O. P. CHAKARVARTY AND ANOTHER
Criminal Misc. Case No. 871 of 1972,
Decided On : 5 -3 -1974

Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which requires the consent of the Advocate-General for a private person to initiate criminal contempt proceedings, is valid and constitutional.

Headnote:

CONTEMPT OF COURT - CRIMINAL CONTEMPT - PROCEDURE - SECTION 15 OF THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971 - INTERPRETATION - POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT OR A HIGH COURT TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT - CONDITIONS PRECEDENT - CONSENT OF THE ADVOCATE-GENERAL - VALIDITY OF SECTION 15 - ARTICLES 129, 215 AND 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, Dr. Janardan Prasad Gupta, alleged that Dr. O.P. Chakravarty and Dr. Niranjan Prasad, the two respondents, had committed criminal contempt of the Allahabad High Court under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The respondents raised a preliminary objection that the petitioner could not initiate contempt proceedings without the consent in writing of the Advocate-General, as required by Section 15 of the Act.

Finding of the Court:

The Allahabad High Court held that Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which requires the consent of the Advocate-General for a private person to initiate criminal contempt proceedings, is valid and constitutional. The Court interpreted Section 15 as placing a statutory bar on a citizen moving the Court for taking action for punishment for criminal contempt, without complying with the mandatory provisions contained in the section.

Issues: 1. Whether Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is ultra vires Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India? 2. Whether Section 15 violates the fundamental right to equality before the law guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is not ultra vires Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India. The Court reasoned that Parliament has the power to legislate on the subject of contempt of court, including the procedure for dealing with contempt matters, under Entries 77 and 14 of Lists I and III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, respectively. The Court further held that Section 15 does not abrogate or cut down the power of the Supreme Court or a High Court to punish for contempt, but rather preserves and upholds it. 2. The Court held that Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, does not violate the fundamental right to equality before the law guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Court reasoned that the classification made by Section 15 between the Advocate-General and private citizens is reasonable and based on the Advocate-General's high status and impartial role in upholding the dignity of the Court.

Final Decision: The Allahabad High Court dismissed the petitioner's petition, holding that the petitioner had no right to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court without compliance with the mandatory provisions contained in Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

JUDGEMENT

K. B. Srivastava, J.:- The petitioner Dr. Janardan Prasad Gupta alleges that Dr. O.P. Chakravarty, Additional Director of Medical and Health Services and Drugs Controller, Uttar Pradesh, and Dr. Niranjan Prasad, Assistant Drugs Controller, Uttar Pradesh, the two respondents before us, have committed criminal contempt of this Court under sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of clause (c) of Section 2, Contempt of Courts Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and consequently they deserve punishment under Section 12 of the Act.

2. It is not disputed by either side that the alleged contempt was not committed in the face of this Court, so as to fall within the purview of Section 14 of the Act. Similarly, it is not disputed that it lies within the ambit of Section 15 of the Act. The proceedings have not been initiated on its own motion by this Court or on a motion made by the Advocate-General. The petitioner further admits that he has not made the motion with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General. The preliminary objection raised by the respondents is that cognizance of a criminal contempt, other than one falling under Section 14, can be taken by this Court only on its own motion, or on a motion made by the Advocate-General, or on a motion made by any other person, with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General, and in no other manner, and since there is non-compliance with the three alternative procedural requirements, therefore, the petition must be ordered to stand dismissed without going into its merits.

3. The preliminary objection raises a short question of law as to the interpretation of Section 15 of the Act. This Section reads thus :-

"15. Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases :-

(1) In the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in Section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by :-

(a) the Advocate-General, or

(b) any other person, with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General.

(2) In the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a motion made by the Advocate-General or, in relation to a Union territory, by such Law Officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf.

(3) Every motion or reference made under this section shall specify the contempt of which the person charged is alleged to be guilty. Explanation ........."

4. Before proceeding to interpret the above section, we deem it necessary to give a brief outline of the scheme and object of the Act. The Act is an Act to define and limit the powers of certain courts in punishing contempts of courts and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto. It consists of 24 Sections Section 1 relates to short title and extent. Section 2 is the definition section. Clause (a) of this section defines "contempt of Court"; clause (b) defines "civil contempt"; cl.(c) defines "criminal contempt"; and cl.(d) defines "High Court". Then follow Sections 3 to 7. The provisions of these five sections pertain to those acts which are not contempt notwithstanding the fact that they may have been deemed to be contempt under the repealed law. Section 8 has been enacted by way of abundant caution permitting the existing law as to defence to be still open in a contempt action. Thus, while Sections 3 to 7 indicate special acts that are not contempt; Section 8 implies that the Act is not exhaustive as to what is not contempt.

The purpose of Section 9 is to emphasise that the Act will not imply enlargement of the scope of contempt, vis-a-vis the prior and existing law. Section 10 relates to the power of a High Court to punish contempts of its subordinate courts. Section 11 confers powers of an extra-territorial nature to try offences committed, or offender found, outside the jurisdiction of a High Court. Section 12 is the punishing section. Sect









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