MALIK, CJ.:-

The short point referred to the Full Bench is as follows:

"Was the respondents application for execution within time in respect of the earlier three years?" The facts of the case are that Shrimati Gulab Dei, respondent, filed a suit in the year 1920 against Sadhu Saran for arrears of maintenance and for future maintenance. She claimed that she was the widow of a member of the joint Hindu family and after the death of her husband she was liable to be maintained from the funds of that family of which Sadhu Saran was in possession as Karta. On 13-12-1920, there was a compromise and a sum of money was paid towards the arrears and the future maintenance was fixed at Rs.250/- per annum payable in four equal instalments falling due on the 31st of March, 30th of June, 30th of September and 31st of December in each year. A charge was also created on certain properties mentioned in the compromise. A decree was passed by the court in terms of the compromise.

2. The judgment-debtor did not, however, pay the maintenance allowance regularly and a series of applications had to be made for execution of the decree. It is not necessary to deal with the earlier applications. The seventh application was filed on 3-3-1938, and the arrears claimed were up to 31-12-1937. It was prayed that certain items of property mentioned in the execution application and over which a charge had been created should be sold by auction. On 4-4-1940, the property was sold. On 8-8-1940, the sale was confirmed. On 22-2-1943, the decree-holder auction-purchaser applied for possession of the property purchased by her at auction. On 30-3-1943, possession was delivered. That terminated those proceedings.

3. On 18-2-1941, the eighth application for execution was filed in which arrears of maintenance were claimed for the years 1938, 1939 and 1940. This application was dismissed for want of prosecution on 23-4-1941.

4. The ninth application, with which we are concerned, was filed on 2-11-1944, and the amount claimed was from 1-1-1938, to 30-9-1944. The judgment-debtor filed an objection that the application was barred by time, but the objection was dismissed by the execution Court. In this appeal by the judgment-debtor the learned counsel for the appellant has confined his objection only to the claim for the first three years, i.e., 1938, 1939 and 1940.

5. An argument was advanced before the Bench hearing the appeal that the application dated 22-2-1943, was a step-in-aid of execution. The question that has, therefore, to be decided is whether the application dated 22-2-1943, could be considered as a step-in-aid of execution. Article 182, limitation Act, provides a period of three years for execution of a decree from the date of the decree or order, or where the application for execution has been made previously, from the date of the final order or where some step-in-aid in execution of the decree or order had been taken, from that date. The answer to the question whether the application dated 22-2-1943, was a step-in-aid of execution would depend on whether the application filed by Shrimati Gulab Dei was in her capacity as a decree-holder and whether it was an application that related to execution, satisfaction or discharge of her decree.

6. It cannot be disputed that Shrimati Gulab Dei had no right under the decree either to claim possession of the property or even to claim that the property be sold to her. The only right that the decree conferred on her was to put it into execution in the manner provided in the Code and one of the modes provided in the Code was to have the property of the judgment-debtor put to sale so that from the sale proceeds the decree might be satisfied. Under O.21, R.72 of the Code, before it was amended, a decree-holder did not even have a right to bid at auction and he could only do so with the express permission of the Court.

That rule has, however, been amended by this Court and the decree-holder has now been put in exactly the same