MOOTHAM, C. J.:- This is in form an appeal from an order of the learned Civil Judge of Rae Bareli dated 15-4-1953.

2. On 29-5-1952, the first respondent filed a suit against the State Government, the Assistant Engineer, Public Works Department, and two other persons. His principal claim in this suit was for the recovery of a substantial sum of money from the State Government as damages for the alleged breach of a contract entered into by him With the State Government on 25-2-1948, where under he was to supply 50,000 C. ft. of Kanpur lime to the Government at a certain price. The other reliefs sought by the plaintiff were not related to the claim founded on the alleged breach of the contract dated 25-2-1948, and with these reliefs we axe not now directly concerned.

3. On 6-10-1952, the first and second defendants filed what purported to be an application under Ss.32 and 34 of the Arbitration Act. They contended that under cl.23 of the contract entered into between the plaintiff and the first defendant all disputes arising out of the contract were to be referred to the Deputy Chief Superintending Engineer for the time being whose decision would be final, and that the Deputy Chief Superintending Engineer had in fact considered and rejected the plaintiffs claim. In these circumstances the defendants submitted that the suit was not maintainable under S.32 of the Arbitration Act, and that under S.34 of the same Act it was incumbent upon them to apply for the proceedings to be stayed.

There was clearly some confusion in the mind of the person who drafted this application and the learned Civil Judge very properly required these defendants to state whether their application was to be deemed to be one under S.32 or under S.34. They elected that it be treated as an application for stay of proceedings under S.34. That application was considered and dismissed by the learned Judge by an order dated 31-3-1954, on the ground that if the arbitration clause applied to the dispute arising out of the contract of 25-2-1948, there had been an award by the arbitrator. No appeal was filed against this order which has become final.

4. The learned Civil Judge left undecided the question whether the arbitration clause applied to the dispute between the parties; his order of 31-3-1954, concluded as follows:

"The plaintiff challenges the existence of the aforesaid arbitration clause in the bond. It is therefore necessary that this question should also be decided before passing any further order. If the question is decided in favour of the plaintiff the suit will proceed and if it is answered in the affirmative the suit will stand dismissed under S.32 of the Arbitration Act. Put up for disposal of this question on the 11th April."

5. On the 11th April the learned Judge heard counsel on this question and by an order dated the 15th April he held that the arbitration clause did not apply to the dispute between the plaintiff and the first and second defendants and directed that the suit should proceed. It is against this order that the first and second defendants have filed the appeal which is now before us.

6. Upon the appeal coming up for hearing learned counsel for the appellant conceded that no appeal lay but he prayed that the memorandum of appeal be treated as an application under S.115 of the Civil P.C. and Art.227 of the Constitution, and we have heard argument on that basis.

7. The argument for the applicant is that the decision of the learned Judge that the arbitration clause had no application to the subject matter of the dispute is wrong in law and that as a result of this erroneous decision the learned Judge will, unless the order be set aside, exercise a jurisdiction not vested in him by law. There is no doubt that this Court can in such circumstances exercise its powers of revision under cl. (c) of S.115 of the Code provided the decision is in a case which has been decided within the meaning of that sub-section: see - Joy Chand Lal v. Kamalaksh