Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel and learned counsel for the gaon sabha.

2. Through this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 29.4.1999 passed by respondent No. 1 in revision No. 10 of 1997-98 (Daryav and others v. Gaon Sabha) as well as order dated 27.2.1998 passed by respondent No. 2 in case No. 217 of 1997 filed under Section 122-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. It appears, for encroachment over gata No. 1086, which is recorded as khalihan, notices were issued to the petitioners on Form 49-A for removal of encroachment of 90 square meter land. The petitioners have filed their objection denying the encroachment over the said land. The Tehsildar vide order dated 27.2.1998 has found the petitioners as unauthorized encroacher over the gaon sabha land and imposed damages of Rs. 2,500/-.

3. Aggrieved by the order dated 27.2.1998, passed by the Tehsildar, petitioners herein filed a revision under Section 333 of the Act, which was barred by time. Petitioners have also filed an application for condonation of delay. The District Magistrate has rejected the petitioners’ application holding that the delay has not been satisfactorily explained. Consequently, he rejected the application for condonation of delay and also dismissed the revision as barred by time.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the delay was explained properly and the District Magistrate has erred in disbelieving the petitioners’ stand taken in the application for condonation of delay.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record.

6. It is not in dispute that the order of Assistant Collector dated 27.2.1998 was challenged by the petitioners on 17.4.1998. The limitation for filing the revision is 30 days.

7. It appears that the revision was barred by time about 20 days.

8. The Limitation Act has been enacted for the purposes of fixing time-limit to a litigant to institute an action. The purpose of the Limitation Act is not to put a bar in instituting an action if a person comes after expiry of period fixed under the Limitation Act for instituting such action as, for many reasons, a person may not be able to institute an action within the time-limit fixed under the Limitation Act and for that purpose, the Legislature has taken care by introducing Section 5 in the Act, which is meant for extension of time of limitation by Court for instituting an action. When a person comes after the expiry of the period of limitation fixed under the Limitation Act, he has to explain the reason for not filing or instituting the action within time. For that purpose, the litigant is supposed to file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay/extension of period of limitation and in case such an application is filed, the Court concerned is supposed to consider the application condoning the delay keeping in mind the justice oriented approach and exercise the discretion as far as possible on the basis of the explanation furnished in favour of a litigant, who has knocked the door of the Court for imparting substantial justice. The law of limitation is not meant to take away the right of appeal and while dealing with the matter under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court must consider such application liberally. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, JT 1987 (1) SC 537, the Apex Court has considered the various aspects, where the condonation of delay is involved and issued following guidelines for the Courts/tribunals while dealing with the delay condonation application:

“1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As agains