Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Heard Sri Yogesh Kumar Singh alongwith Sri Subhash Singh Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents.

2. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the orders dated 15.7.2013 passed by the Additional Commissioner (Judicial II) Varanasi Division Varanasi in Revision No. 231 of 2013 (Imran Ansari v. Tasrifun and others) and order dated 26.9.2013 passed by the learned Member Board of Revenue in Revision No. 2668/LR/2012-13 (Tasrifun Nisha and others v. Imran Ansari and others).

3. Vide order dated 15.7.2013, the Additional Commissioner has allowed the revision by setting aside the order dated 30.4.2010 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer in a proceeding under Section 33/39 of U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 (in short ‘the Act’). Whereas by the subsequent order dated 26.9.2013, petitioner’s revision has been dismissed with the finding that there is no illegality in the order passed by the learned Additional Commissioner.

4. While assailing the impugned orders, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the Revision No. 231 of 2013 was filed against the order dated 30.4.2010 and the said revision was barred by time. The learned Additional Commissioner has allowed the revision at the admission stage without condoning the delay and without issuing notice to the petitioner and the learned Member Board of Revenue has committed manifest error of law in not interfering with the order dated 15.7.2013 saying that the order was passed on merit.

5. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that once the statute provides period of limitation and also provides that if any person approaches the Court after expiry of period of limitation, he can get the benefit of Section 5 of Limitation Act. In that eventuality, if at the time of filing of revision, there was no application for condonation of delay, only course for the revisional Court was to dismiss the revision as barred by time and in no case, he could proceed with the matter to decide the case on merit, unless an application is filed for condonation of delay and the delay is condoned after due notice to the parties concerned.

6. The view taken by me finds support from the decision of the Apex Court in Noharlal Verma v. District Cooperative Central Bank Ltd., Jagdalpur, 2008 14 SCC 445, where the Apex Court has held as under :

“32. Now, limitation goes to the root of the matter. If a suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation a Court or an adjudicating authority has no jurisdiction, power or authority to entertain such suit, appeal or application and to decide it on merits.

33. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under:

“ 3. Bar of Limitation.—(1) Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not be set up as a defence.”

Bare reading of the aforesaid provision leaves no room for doubt that if a suit is instituted, appeal is preferred or application is made after the prescribed period, it has to be dismissed even though no such plea has been raised or defence has been set up. In other words, even in the absence of such plea by the defendant, respondent or opponent, the Court or authority must dismiss such suit, appeal or application, if it is satisfied that the suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation.”

7. In V.M. Salgaocar and Bros. v. Board of Trustees of Port of Mormugao and another, 2005 (4) SCC 613, following observation has been made by the Apex Court.

“20. The mandate of Section 3 of the Limitation Act is that it is the duty of the Court to dismiss any suit instituted after the prescribed period of limitation irrespective of the fact that limitation has not been set up as a defence. If a suit is ex facie barred by the law of