Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—This application under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”) has been preferred with a sole prayer that Courts below be directed to consider bail application of applicants, on the same day, pursuant to First Information Report dated 28.4.2014 (Case Crime No. 408 of 2014) under Sections 147, 307, 120-B I.P.C.) registered at P.S. Chakeri, District Kanpur Nagar, in the light of decision of this Court in Smt.Amarawati and another v. State of U.P., 2004 (57) ALR 390 as approved by Apex Court in Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P., 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC).

2. I am required to consider whether such an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with the prayer, as aforesaid, is entertainable. The scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C., as is evident from a bare reading of aforesaid provision, can be culled out from the provision itself, which reads as under:

“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” (emphasis added)

3. The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not to be exercised in a routine manner, but it is for limited purposes, namely, to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Time and again, Supreme Court and various High Courts, including ours one, have reminded when exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be justified, which cannot be placed in straight jacket formula, but one thing is very clear that it should not preampt a trial and cannot be used in a routine manner so as to cut short the entire process of trial before the Courts below. If from a bare perusal of First Information Report or complaint, it is evident that it does not disclose any offence at all or it is frivolous, collusive or oppressive on the face of it, the Court may exercise its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. but it should be exercised sparingly. This will not include as to whether prosecution is likely to establish its case or not, whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it, accusation would not be sustained, or the other circumstances, which would not justify exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. I need not go into various aspects in detail but it would be suffice to refer a few recent authorities dealing all these matters in detail, namely, State of Haryana and others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, Popular Muthiah v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2006) 7 SCC 296, Hamida v. Rashid @ Rasheed and others, (2008) 1 SCC 474, Dr. Monica Kumar and another v. State of U.P. and others, (2008) 8 SCC 781, M.N. Ojha and others v. Alok Kumar Srivastav and another, (2009) 9 SCC 682, State of A.P. v. Gourishetty Mahesh and others, JT 2010 (6) SC 588 and Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Incorporated and others, 2011 (1) SCC 74.

4. In Lee Kun Hee and others v. State of U.P. and others, JT 2012 (2) SC 237, it was reiterated that Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot go into the truth or otherwise of the allegations and appreciate evidence, if any, available on record. Interference would be justified only when a clear case of such interference is made out. Frequent and uncalled interference even at the preliminary stage by High Court may result in causing obstruction in the progress of inquiry in a criminal case which may not be in public interest. It, however, may not be doubted, if on the face of it, either from the First Information Report or complaint, it is evident that allegation are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no fair-minded and informed obs