The main legal point established is that the civil court has jurisdiction to hear matters related to the termination of services, and the suit was not barred by procedural requirements under Section 80 CPC or Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act.

Plaintiff appellant was a constable in the Central Reserve Police Force. He was involved in a criminal case and was arrested and released on bail. He was put under suspension. He proceeded on leave from 14.5.1990 to 12.6.1990 with due permission granted on 8.5.1990. He applied for extension of leave but the extension was not granted. He absented from duty or over stayed on leave and on the said ground his services were terminated w.e.f. 5.6.1992.

The plaintiff appellant instituted Original Suit No.138 of 1993 for declaring the order of termination as illegal, null and void. The suit was filed without serving notice under Section 80 CPC upon the Central Government ie., the Union of India, one of the defendants to the suit.

The suit was contested on merits and on certain technical pleas vis-a-vis the jurisdiction of the court; the suit being barred by Central Administrative Tribunal Act and for want of notice under Section 80 CPC; and that Union of India was not properly arrayed.

The court of first instance on all the above pleas framed issues and finally vide judgment and order dated 30.5.1996 decreed the same and the order of termination of services of the plaintiff appellant dated 5.6.1992 was declared to be illegal null and void. The court held that the suit is not barred by Central Administrative Tribunal Act; it is not bad even for want of notice under Section 80 CPC as Court had granted leave to sue without notice; the suit is also not bad for mis-joinder of parties on account of Union of India not being arrayed properly as both the Union of India as well as Central Reserved Police Force were duly represented; the defendant-respondents are unable to establish that the civil court has no jurisdiction in the matter; and the termination of the services of the plaintiff appellant are in violation of the principles of natural justice.

The defendant respondents aggrieved by the judgment, order and decree passed by the first court preferred an appeal. The said appeal has been allowed by the impugned judgment and order dated 16.10.1998 and after setting aside the decree passed by the court below below the suit has been dismissed.

The lower appellate court has allowed the appeal and non suited the plaintiff appellant only on two counts; first, suit is bad for want of notice under Section 80 CPC and secondly, it is barred by Section 41(h) of the Specific relief Act. No other finding of the lower court has been touched or interfered with.

It is against the judgment, order and decree of the lower appellate court that this second appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff-appellant.

Sri Pradeep Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the appellant raising the aforesaid two points has submitted that in all other respects the judgment and order of the trial court has attained finality and therefore if the above two questions of law are decided in favour of the plaintiff appellant the suit would stand decreed.

In view of the above facts and circumstances and the respective submissions of the parties following two substantial questions of law arises for determination in the present appeal:-

1.Whether the suit is bad for want of notice under Section 80 CPC to the Union of India even when it was instituted with the leave of the Court?

2.Whether the suit is barred by Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act?

I have heard Sri Pradeep Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant and Sri Tej Prakash, learned counsel for the Union of India on both the above questions of law.

First Question:

The suit was admittedly instituted by the plaintiff appellant without issuing/serving any notice as required under Section 80 CPC upon the respondents. However, the record reveals that the suit was accompanied by an application for leave to sue without such a notice. The court of first instance on consideration of the said application vide order dated 23.3.1993 had allowed the said application and in view of the urgency of the matter had