By the Court.—The claim of the petitioner for refund of additional electricity surcharge which was levied and recovered during the period starting from 1992 to 2008 came to be dismissed by the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum Kanpur. The said order of the Forum was subjected to a challenge before the first respondent, the Electricity Ombudsman, who rejected the appeal in light of the provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Act). This petition lays challenge to the aforesaid two orders.

2. In exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 42 and 181 of the Electricity Act, 2003, the U.P. Electricity Regulatory Commission has framed the U.P.E.R.C (Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum and Electricity Ombudsman) Regulations, 2007 (Regulations). The Regulations under Clause 3 require every Distribution Licensee to constitute a Grievance Redressal Forum comprising of a judicial member, a technical member and an officer of the licensee. The Forum is an adjudicatory authority, which is enjoined to entertain and adjudicate upon complaints which may be instituted before it by a consumer. Clause 6.9 of the Regulations requires the Forum to adjudicate upon a complaint by means of a speaking order. In terms of Clause 8 any consumer aggrieved by an order passed by the Forum or in a situation where the Forum, in his opinion, has failed to redress the grievance, is entitled to prefer a representation to the Electricity Ombudsman. Such a representation is liable to be made by the consumer within 30 days of the order of the Forum.

3. The Ombudsman has proceeded to reject the claim of the petitioner noting that he had willingly deposited the additional surcharge during 1992 to 2008. It however accepted the submission advanced on behalf of the distribution licensee that the claim was barred by Section 3 of the Act. It is this view taken by the Ombudsman which is assailed before us.

4. Now it must be borne in mind that an issue of limitation primarily raises the question of the right of a person to institute proceedings or lodge a claim before a Court and seek relief in respect thereof. The Schedule to the Act sets out the “Periods of Limitation” prescribing the time within which the proceedings may be instituted or lodged. The ancillary issue which the Act addresses is the circumstances in which the period of limitation may be extended or the delay in institution be condoned. Both the above, however stand on an independent pedestal. The issue of extension of the period of limitation or the condonation of delay comes into play only upon it being found that the period of limitation prescribed has expired or run its course. The other fundamental aspect which will have to be borne in mind is that the Act itself applies to suits, appeals and applications instituted in Courts. The Act does not have a general or all pervading application to proceedings before statutory authorities or adjudicatory forums.

5. Now admittedly, neither the Forum nor the Electricity Ombudsman is a Court. The proceeding instituted before it is neither a suit nor an appeal or application as understood and envisaged under the Act. The Act, strictly speaking, therefore, has no application. The issue which then arises is whether in the absence of the Limitation Act applying stricto sensu, principles analogous thereto would apply to adjudicatory forums which are not Courts. This issue directly fell for consideration before a Division Bench of the Court in Pradeshik Cooperative Dairy Federation Ltd. v. Authority Under Minimum Wages Act and others, Special Appeal No. 898 of 2015, 2016(2) ADJ 229. Dealing with the aforesaid issue the Division Bench held as follows:

“The learned Single Judge seems to have proceeded on the basis that there was no provision under Rule 29(4) under which the period of limitation of one month that is prescribed could be extended or a delay could be condoned.

Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides as follows:

“(2) Where any spe