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2015 Supreme(All) 2512

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Ram Surat Ram (Maurya), J.
Sharda Prasad Tiwari - Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. and Ors. - Respondent
Writ-B No. 6490 of 2015
Decided On : 26-03-2015

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant : R.S. Pandey and Rajshree Malviya
For the Respondents: C.S.C.

The main legal point established in the judgment is the maintainability of an appeal based on a challenge to a compromise decree and the validity of filing an appeal after the closure of consolidation operations.

Headnote:

Appeal - U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 - Section 52, Order XLIII Rule 1-A, Order XXIII Rule 3-A - The court discussed the maintainability of an appeal based on a compromise decree and the jurisdiction to file an appeal after the closure of consolidation operations. The judgment highlighted the legal provisions and interpretations of the Supreme Court in similar cases, emphasizing the challenge to a compromise and the validity of an appeal after the closure of consolidation operations.

Fact of the Case:

The writ petition was filed to quash the proceedings of Appeal No. 1132 of 2002 and orders of Settlement Officer Consolidation and Deputy Director of Consolidation in a title proceeding under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. The dispute related to co-tenancy in a land plot during consolidation, and the appeal was challenged on the basis of a compromise decree and the closure of consolidation operations.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the appeal based on a compromise decree was maintainable as the factum of compromise was challenged. Additionally, the court held that the appeal was valid even after the closure of consolidation operations, citing legal provisions and interpretations from previous Supreme Court judgments.

Issues: The issues involved the maintainability of an appeal based on a compromise decree and the jurisdiction to file an appeal after the closure of consolidation operations.

Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the challenge to the factum of compromise, which rendered the appeal maintainable. Additionally, the court relied on legal provisions and interpretations to support the validity of the appeal after the closure of consolidation operations.

Final Decision: The writ petition was dismissed as the court found no merit in the arguments presented.

JUDGMENT

Ram Surat Ram (Maurya), J.

1. Heard Sri R.S. Pandey, for the petitioner. The writ petition has been filed for quashing the proceedings of Appeal No. 1132 of 2002 and orders of Settlement Officer Consolidation dated 7.8.2013 and Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 8.9.2014 passed in title proceeding in U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

2. The dispute relates to basic consolidation year khata 105 consisting plot 309 (area 2-7-5 bigha) of village Puredurawa Uparwar, pargana Bhadohi, district Sant Ravidas Nagar Bhadohi, which was recorded in the name of Ram Adhar, father of respondents-4 and 5 (hereinafter referred to as the respondents). During consolidation, the petitioner and his brothers filed an objection claiming co-tenancy in the land in dispute. It is alleged that the parties appeared before Assistant Consolidation Officer on 29.11.1983, and entered into compromise in presence of two members of Consolidation Committee, which was signed by them and on its basis, the names of the petitioner and his brothers were directed to be recorded as co-tenants in the disputed land. Thereafter chak was carved out in the names of the petitioner and his brothers. The consolidation was closed in the village by notification dated 30.4.1990 under section 52 of the Act.

3. The respondents filed a time barred appeal (registered as Appeal No. 1132 of 2002), on 13.5.2002, along with delay condonation application. Settlement Officer Consolidation by order dated 18.12.2003, condoned the delay in filing appeal, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of Assistant Consolidation Officer dated 29.11.1983 and remanded the matter to Consolidation Officer to decide the case on merit in accordance with law. The respondents filed a revision (registered as Revision No. 154/475) from the aforesaid order. Deputy Director of Consolidation, by order dated 26.7.2010 allowed the revision and remanded the case to Settlement Officer Consolidation, to decide delay condonation application before deciding the appeal on merit. The respondents challenged the aforesaid order in Writ-B No. 49484 of 2010, which was dismissed on 18.8.2010.

4. Settlement Officer Consolidation, by order dated 7.8.2013, condoned the delay in filing the appeal, after remand. The petitioner and his brothers filed a revision (registered as Revision No. 170 of 2013-14) from the aforesaid order. However, this writ petition has been filed for the relieves mentioned above during pendency of the revision before Deputy Director of Consolidation. The order of Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 8.9.2014, challenged in the writ petition, is an order of adjournment of the revision, due to advocates strikes.

5. The Counsel for the petitioner submits that order of Assistant Consolidation Officer dated 29.11.1983, is based on compromise between the parties. Being consent order, it could not be challenged in appeal and the appeal was not maintainable. He relied upon the judgments of Supreme Court in Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao v. Valluri Jagannadha Rao AIR 1967 SC 591 , in which it has been held that compromise decree, based on the agreement of the parties, creates an estoppel by conduct between the parties. Katikara Chintamani Dora v. Guntreddi Annamanaidu AIR 1974 SC 1069 , in which it has been held that the bar to an appeal against a consent decree, in sub-section (3) of section 96 of the Code is based on the broad principle of estoppel. It presupposes that the parties to an action can, expressly or by implication, waive or forego their right of appeal by any lawful agreement or compromise, or even by conduct. Therefore, as soon as the parties made the agreement to abide by the determination and induced the Court to pass a decree in terms of that agreement, the principle of estoppel underlying section 96(3) became operative and the decree to the extent it was in terms of that agreement, became final and binding between the parties. And, it was as ef











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