The main legal point established in the judgment is that appointments in violation of statutory rules, such as Regulation 4, are null and void, and equity and sympathetic considerations have no role in dealing with the legality of such appointments.

Dr. Dhanjaya Yaswant Chandrachud, C.J. and Yaswant Varma, J. –

Both the Special Appeals question the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge on 17 March 2015 in terms of which two writ petitions preferred seeking quashing of an order dated 27/29 November 1992 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Jaunpur came to be allowed. The order of the District Inspector of Schools upheld the appointment of the appellant as an Assistant Teacher in the Gangadin Ram Kumar Inter College. Since the two writ petitions and the challenge to the appointment of the appellant have a history it would be apposite to briefly note the same.

Appointment of the Appellant

2. The appellant is stated to have been appointed as an Assistant Clerk in the institution consequent to a vacancy having come into existence on 18 September 1972. The appellant came to be appointed against this vacancy on 30 December 1986. At the relevant time when the appointment was effected in favour of the appellant his father was working as the Officiating/Adhoc Principal in the institution. This appointment was approved by the District Inspector of Schools by an order dated 3 June 1987. Acting upon a complaint dated 2 July 1987, the DIOS instituted an enquiry. The challenge to the appointment of the appellant was on the ground that the same had come to be made in violation of the provision of Regulation 4 falling under Chapter III of the Regulations framed under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. Regulation 4 prohibits the appointment of any teacher who may be related to a member of the Committee of Management, Head Master or teacher. In order to avoid any adverse comment, the management terminated the services of the appellant by an order dated 12 December 1988. This order was challenged by the appellant by means of a writ petition [Writ Petition No. 3135 of 1988 decided on 25.2.1992] which came to be allowed on the ground that the termination had come to be made in breach of the principles of natural justice. The Court accorded liberty to the DIOS to complete the enquiry afresh after affording opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties. It was pursuant to this direction that the DIOS proceeded in the matter and ultimately passed the order dated 27/29 November 1992.

Writ Petition No. 8265 of 1993 [First Writ Petition]

3. Assailing the order of the DIOS the first writ petition came to be filed by the Committee of Management through Sri Virendra Kumar Pandey asserting himself to be the manager of the institution. This petition initially came to be allowed on 5 February 2004 on the ground of the appointment having come to be made in the absence of a vacancy in the institution as also on account of infraction of Regulation 4 of Chapter III of the Regulations. Two separate applications for recall came to be filed in these proceedings- one by the appellant and the other by Sri Virendra Kumar Pandey. The appellant sought recall of the order dated 5 February 2004 on the ground that the name of his counsel was not correctly printed in the cause list as a result of which he could not attend the proceedings. Pandey filed an application alleging that he had not authorised the filing of the writ petition through counsel. The application of the appellant came to be allowed on 8 November 2004 and the judgment dated 5 February 2004 came to be recalled. No orders were passed on the application made by Pandey.

Writ Petition No. 55339 of 2004 [Second Writ Petition]

4. Being unsure of the conduct and motives of Pandey and as the learned Single Judge records, as a matter of abundant caution, the Committee of Management filed this petition also assailing the order of the DIOS dated 27/29 November 1992.

5. We may note that the learned Single Judge has by the judgment impugned dismissed the application of Pandey moved in the first writ petition and has also commented upon his conduct. For the purposes of these appeals, however, we have heard learned counsel for the contesting parties