The judgment established that the right of extension of a lease must be supported by statutory provisions or terms of the lease, and the court emphasized the importance of following prescribed procedures for lease extensions.

Manoj Kumar Gupta, J.

The petitioner, a proprietorship concern, has filed the instant petition seeking quashing of order dated 21.10.2016 passed by the first respondent rejecting the representations dated 20.4.2016 and 3.10.2016, whereby the petitioner had requested the State Government to extend duration of the mining lease for the obstructed period of 1 year 11 months and 10 days and for a mandamus commanding the respondents to grant permission of mining to him for the obstructed period of 1 year 11 months and 10 days over plot no. 3536 Gha area 4.35 acre situated at Gram Bailli Markundi, Pargana Aghori, Tehsil Robertsgtanj, District Sonbhadra.

2. The lease in favour of the petitioner was from 10.10.1996 to 9.10.2006. According to the petitioner, he could not operate the lease for the period 6.6.1998 to 1.3.2000 on account of an order passed by the District Magistrate, which later on was quashed in writ petition no. 29426 of 1998 by order of this Court dated 6.12.1999. The petitioner was again not able to operate the lease from 27.9.2001 to 19.12.2001 on account of another order of the District Magistrate dated 27.9.2001. Thus, according to the petitioner, he could not operate the lease for a total period of 1 year 11 months and 10 days. Consequently, the petitioner made representations dated 20.4.2016 and 3.10.2016 for being granted permission to operate the lease at the same site for the obstructed period and upon rejection of the representations by the impugned order, the instant writ petition has been filed.

3. Sri W.H. Khan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has placed reliance on a judgement of the Supreme Court in Beg Raj Singh v. State of U.P., (2003) (1) SCC 726, in contending that the petitioner has a right to seek extension of lease for the obstructed period.

4. We have carefully gone through the judgement of the Supreme Court and we find that the same is not applicable to the facts of the instant case for more than one reason. In the matter before the Supreme Court, the lessee of the mining lease was a person who had identified and explored a new mining area and had made huge expenditure in making the area approachable. The policy of the State Government at the relevant time was to grant lease to such persons on 'first come first serve basis' for period extending from 3 to 5 years. However, the petitioner was granted lease only for one year and after its expiry, he applied for extension of lease for two years contending that under the Government order, he was entitled for lease for a minimum period of 3 years. The District Magistrate allowed his request and extended the lease for two years. In the meantime, a revision came to be filed by a third party, contending that the mining rights should have been settled by auction. The revision was allowed by the State Government holding that in case the mining rights are settled by auction, it is likely to fetch higher revenue. The order passed in revision was challenged before the High Court. Although the High Court agreed with the petitioner that the lease, as initially granted, should have been for a period of 3 years but still no relief was granted to the petitioner, as the High Court was of the opinion that the settlement of the lease by public auction would subserve public interest, by fetching more revenue. The matter was thereafter agitated before the Supreme Court, which in the facts and circumstances of that case held that once there was Government policy for grant of lease for a total period of 3 years and the High Court having found that the order passed in revision setting aside the order of the Collector granting extension of two years was invalid, it was not justified in refusing to grant consequential relief to the petitioner. The Supreme Court, while allowing the Special Leave Petition specifically took notice of the fact that no mistake was attributable to the petitioner; that no third party interest came to be created in