JUDGMENT

Bennet, J. - These are two second appeals brought by the Arya Co-operative Bank Society against decrees of the lower Appellate Court. The opposite party Pt. Shiv Charan was the plaintiff and the Society was the defendant. The first mentioned appeal is from a decree in O.S. No. 409 of 1936 and that suit dealt with an arbitration decree in case No. 39 of 1932. There was a member of the Society called Pran Sukh who owed the Society money and he died seven years before the suit. The Society claimed that the plaintiff represented Pran Sukh and plaintiff said he did not represent Pran Sukh. The Society then referred this matter to the Registrar under Rule 115, U.P. Co-operative Societies Rules of 1937. The Registrar referred the matter to an arbitrator Gauri Shankar and Gauri Shankar passed what purported to be a personal decree against the plaintiff in case No. 39 of 1932 of the arbitrator. The other original suit, No. 417 of 1936 which forms the subject of the second appeal No. 1984 of 1937, arose by a claim of the Society against Sukh Ram, the father of plaintiff. In the same way the Society referred this matter to the Registrar under Rule 115 and the Registrar referred the matter to Gauri Shankar and Gauri Shankar passed a personal decree against the plaintiff in case No. 40 of 1932.

2. The plaintiff then brought a suit in the Civil Court for a declaration that the personal decrees passed against him were null and void and further that certain proceedings in execution in the Court of the Collector taken under those decrees were null and void and that the property mentioned in the plaint which had been attached in execution of those decrees was not attachable or saleable. The defence was among other grounds that the suit was not cognizable in the Civil Court. This is the first matter which has been argued in these appeals. The trial Court held that the suits were not cognizable in the Civil Court and dismissed the suits. The lower Appellate Court reversed that decision and granted a relief as follows in appeal No. 42 of 1937:

The result is that I allow the appeal, set aside the decree and judgment of the lower Court and decree the salt inasmuch as a declaration is granted that the decree of the arbitrator is not binding on the appellant except in his capacity as representative of the deceased member Piran Sukh and further that the property attached at present mentioned in the plaint is not liable to attachment in the decree.

3. The Court further ordered:

The other appeal, No.46 of 1937, is also allowed, the judgment and decree of the lower Court is set aside and the suit is decreed inasmuch as a declaration is granted that the decree of the arbitrator is not binding on the appellant except in his capacity as representative of Sukh Ram, deceased, and that the property attached is not liable to attachment.

4. It will be observed that the lower appellate Court has held that the personal decrees against the plaintiff are null and void and that the Civil Court can set those personal decrees aside and that the attachment in consequence of those decrees should also be set aside. The Court has however held that the decree of the arbitrator would be binding on the plaintiff so far as he was a legal representative of the deceased Pran Sukh or of the deceased Sukh Ram. The two second appeals ask that the decree of the trial Court should be restored and learned Counsel, when asked what was it that he desired in second appeals, stated that the suits should be dismissed on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. In other words, this means that the personal decrees against the plaintiff should stand and the proceedings of attachment in execution of those personal decrees. The question therefore is whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction to pass personal decrees against the plaintiff. For authority for this proposition, learned Counsel referred to the Co-operative Societies Act, Act 2 of 1912, Section 43(2)(i) which states that t