JUDGMENT

1. This appeal arises out of a suit for sale upon the foot of a simple mortgage bond which was executed by one Mt. Janki Kunwar on 11th November 1898. The claim was for Rs. 21,000; but there was also an alternative prayer for possession of the property and for recovery of Rs. 10,000 as interest by way of damages. The mortgagor was a pardanashin lady and was a widow, her husband having died as long ago as 1878. The bond in suit was for Rs. 11,000 and the mortgaged property consisted of a four annas share in each of four villages. It was stipulated that a sum of Rs. 850 should be paid annually as interest and that in default of payment in any year the mortgagees should have a right after four months' grace to enter into possession of two of the mortgaged shares and recover the balance of interest due to them at the rate of Re. 1-4-0 per cent. per mensem. The period agreed upon for payment of the mortgage money was 10 years and the mortgagor was given a right to redeem the property at any time within that period on payment of Rs. 10,000. It appears that Mt. Janki Kunwar paid interest regularly up to within a day or two of her death, which occurred on 23rd November 1918. The present suit was filed by the mortgagees, the firm Kothi Radha Kishan Gopi Kishan, on 13th November 1930 and it was claimed on their behalf that the suit was within limitation by reason of various acknowledgments and payments of interest. The last acknowledgment is said to have been made by Mt. Janki Kunwar on 16th November 1918 in a registered lease which she executed on that day in favour of certain persons; and the last payment of interest is alleged to have been made on the following day, i.e. on 17th November 1918. It is said that this payment was made on the mortgagor's behalf by the lessees under the deed of 16th November.

2. As we have already said, Mt. Janki Kunwar died on 23rd November 1918. The defendants first party are reversioners, being the heirs of her husband; the defendants second party are subsequent mortgagees; the defendant third party was impleaded pro forma as having a right of suit with the plaintiffs and was subsequently transposed as a plaintiff; and the defendant fourth party is a widow in the joint family of the plaintiffs and was impleaded by reason of the fact that she had instituted a suit against the plaintiffs in which she claimed to be her husband's heir.

3. The defence was that the suit was barred by limitation, that the bond in suit was not duly executed, that it was without consideration and that there was no legal necessity for the alienation. The learned Subordinate Judge of Aligarh has found in favour of the plaintiffs on all points and has passed a preliminary decree for sale under Order 34, Rule 4, Civil P.C. The defendants reversioners have come in appeal to this Court. Learned Counsel for the defendants-appellants concedes execution of the bond in suit, which in the case of a pardanashin lady means intelligent execution." He pleads, however, that the suit is barred by time and he also pleads want of consideration and legal necessity.

4. As regards the plea of limitation, the first point which has been argued before us is that the acknowledgment of 16th November 1918-which was not addressed to the mortgagees-cannot operate to extend the period of limitation inasmuch as it is not shown to have been communicated to the said mortgagees; but it is not necessary for us to consider this point inasmuch as no attempt has been made to challenge the lower Court's finding that on 17th November 1918 interest was paid as such within the meaning of Section 20, Limitation Act. It is next contended that one suit became barred on 11th November 1920 under the law of limitation which as then in force and that there could be no revival of the right of suit by the amendment which was subsequently made by the legislature to Section 21 of the Act. It is an admitted fact that under the law of limitation, as it stood on 11th November 192