JUDGMENT

Walsh, J. - In this case an application was made to the Subordinate Judge by the judgment-debtors u/s 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, complaining of a seizure of Immovable property belonging to them, made by the decree-holders in excess of their rights under the decree. The Subordinate Judge, after an elaborate inquiry, has found as a fact that the decree-holders took advantage of some ambiguous language in the decree, and deliberately and dishonestly seized more than their decree entitled them to seize.

2. The decree was dated the 31st March 1911. The improper seizure took place on the 19th November 1911. The application in question was made to the Subordinate Judge on the 7th July 1913. This delay of nineteen months was due to the judgment-debtors having mistaken their rights and wasted time over a fruitless application. The reason, however, for the delay is immaterial. The delay itself has given rise to the question we have to decide.

3. The improper seizure by the decree-holders in excess of their rights under the decree was clearly a question arising between the parties to the suit within the meaning of Section 17. The application of the judgment-debtors was clearly made under that section.

4. On appeals being brought by both the decree-holders and the judgment-debtors, the District Judge, holding himself, as we think quite properly, bound by certain authorities mentioned hereafter, decided that the judgment debtors' application was time-barred, on the ground that Article 165 of the Limitation Act applied to it and that the time limit of 30 days had run out.

5. We are clearly of opinion that when the matter is closely examined this view is untenable.

6. In a technical matter of this kind, when the language relied upon does not in express terms cover the case, it is of the highest importance to realize the position of the parties and the context in which the language is used. Where the interpretation sought to be put upon the words is arrived at by implication and by reference, the Court ought not to adopt a con-struction which has a restricting and penalizing operation, unless it is driven to do so by the irresistible force of language.

7. Now in the ordinary course of things a person who is wrongfully dispossessed of Immovable property has a remedy by a suit for possession only. In matters arising out of the execution of decrees, possibly because they are the indirect result of the active interference of the Court itself, the Legislature has provided two exceptions. The judgment-debtor must apply to the Court u/s 47. If he is dispossessed of land which is outside the decree, and if he does not so apply, he loses his land. He cannot bring a suit. He is worse off than the ordinary person wrongfully dispossessed. On the other Land, if a third person outside the suit is unfortunately the victim of some mistake in the decree itself, or by the decree-holder, he may apply to the Court in a summary manner, and if he is right he may be put back into possession. That is expressly provided by Order XXI, Rules 100 and 101. Such a person is better off than the ordinary person wrongfully dispossessed. He can bring a suit, of course, within 12 years; but he can, if he pleases, apply summarily for possession. That is a privilege of a peculiar and special character, from which the judgment-debtor is excluded in express terms.

8. It is not surprising to find such a privilege accompanied by certain restrictions. By Article 165 of the Limitation Act of 1908 (the Article now in question) such an application must be made within 30 days. The Article is in these terms:

Description of application.--Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by a person dispossessed of Immovable property, and disputing the right of the decree-holder or purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree to be put into possession.

"Period of limitation.--Thirty days, from the date of dispossession.

9. Now that is a precise and compendious description of the right given, and