JUDGMENT

Straight, Offg. C.J.

1. In my opinion the first question to be considered in this case is, whether, upon the facts as stated by plaintiff himself, he has any locus standi to maintain the suit. The general rule of Hindu law is, that a daughter's son can never succeed to the estate of his grandfather so long as there is in existence any daughter who is entitled to take, either as heir or by survivorship to her other sisters. This is the effect of the ruling of the Lords of the Privy Council in Aumirtolal Bose v. Rajoneekant Mitter 15 B.L.R. 10 : 2 Ind. App. 113 and also of the other cases cited by Mr. Mayne in his excellent work on Hindu Law and Usage, Section 478. In Section 479 of the same work the learned author, upon the authority of the ruling of this Court in Sibta v. Badri Prasad ILR All. 134 goes on to say that, according to the Mitakshara law, a daughter's son takes his maternal grandfather's estate as full proprietor; on his death such estate devolves on his heirs and not on the heirs of his maternal grandfather, but that until the death of the last daughter capable of being an heiress, he takes no interest whatever, and can transmit none, and therefore if he should die before the last of such daughters leaving a son, that son would not succeed because he belongs to a completely different family, and he would offer no oblation to the maternal grandfather of his own father. These I take to be the undoubted propositions of the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, and fully consistent with the rule laid down by this Court in Baijnath v. Mahabir ILR All. 608 so far as that case follows the ruling of the Privy Council above referred to. In short, a daughter's son--to use the words of Mr. Mayne--"takes not as heir to any daughter who may have died, but as heir to his own grandfather, and, of course, cannot take at all so long as there is a nearer heir in existence." I do not understand any of the rulings to which I have referred to lay down any rule which goes beyond saying that, during the existence of any daughters, the daughter's son cannot succeed to--that is to say, obtain proprietary possession of--his maternal grandfather's estate in a divided Hindu family; and it seems to me equally clear that, whenever, according to the rule of succession, the daughter's son does succeed to his maternal grandfather's estate, he succeeds as "full owner" in the sense in which that expression is understood in Hindu law. Now, this being so, I hold that during the lifetime of a daughter, the position of the daughter's son, with reference to his maternal grandfather's divided estate, is, at least by a close analogy, similar to the status of such reversioners as trace their descent through the main line to the full owner. This is a conclusion which I think is borne out by the learned summary of the historical aspect of the rights of a daughter's son given by Mr. Mayne in Section 477 of his work and I may add that the circumstance of the daughter's son being born after the death of his maternal grandfather, would have no effect upon his rights in a case such as the present. But it is of course clear that those rights do not entitle him under ordinary circumstances to succeed to the maternal grandfather's estate during the existence of a daughter, whether she be his own mother or maternal aunt. The claim for possession in this case was, therefore, rightly dismissed by the Munsif, but the question remains whether the declaratory decree, which he awarded to the plaintiff, was rightly interfered with by the Lower Appellate Court.

2. Upon this last question the nature of the plaint has to be considered, and after having read the pleadings in the case, I am of opinion that the prayer in the plaint is expressly and clearly wide enough to include a prayer for declaratory relief. This being so, the next point is, whether the plaint discloses any such circumstances as would entitle the plaintiff to ask for a decree such as the Munsif has given him.